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I. WHAT LIES AHEAD
The 1991 Corporate Transfer Act' represents a legislative
attempt to close a court-made loophole that allows a sophisti-
cated taxpayer to avoid Washington's Real Estate Excise Tax
1. 1991 Wash. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 22.
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("REET"2 ). Specifically, this loophole allows a real estate
owner to (1) create a corporation, (2) transfer his real estate to
that corporation as a contribution to capital, (3) sell the corpo-
ration to a second individual, who would (4) liquidate the cor-
poration, receive title to the real estate, and avoid REET.3
Despite the Washington State Legislature's 1991 attempt
to close REET's loophole, several problems and a great deal of
confusion still exist. In fact, the legislature left REET in a
greater state of disrepair than before. The simplest method to
address this dilemma would be to completely rewrite the
REET statute. The legislature's attempt in 1992, however,
failed.' As a result, Washington tax planners face a REET
statute that leaves several unanswered questions and provides
significant tax relief to the smart practitioner's client.5
The purpose of this Comment, therefore, is twofold. First,
it gives the reader a complete understanding of Washington's
real estate excise tax as it exists today. Here the reader will
learn what REET is and how the Washington State Supreme
Court, in a series of rulings, created the currently existing cor-
porate transfer loophole. Second, this Comment advocates
replacing the current law.
Specifically, this Comment takes the position that REET is
in desperate need of repair; it then considers the options avail-
able to the Washington State Legislature in 1993. This Com-
ment concludes that, with a few important alterations, the
solution lies in a proposal that died in the House Revenue
Committee in 1992.6
2. REET is the acronym for Washington State's real estate excise tax as codified
in WASH. REV. CODE cI. 82.45 (1989).
3. It is estimated that closure of the current loophole could raise an additional
$11.5 million of state revenue per fiscal year. See infra note 344 and accompanying
text.
4. A proposal to completely rewrite Washington's REET was considered by the
1992 legislature. The 1992 proposal, however, was tabled for study prior to final
legislative action to allow for further consideration of the proposal's probable effects
on future realty transfers.
5. Discussion of federal taxation is beyond the scope of this Comment.
Nevertheless, tax planners should consider federal tax requirements when planning
REET transactions. For example, repeal of the General Utilities doctrine directly
applies to corporate realty transfers. See General Utilities and Operating Co. v.
Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935); see also I.R.C. § 311(a)(2) (1954) (repealed 1986); BORIS
I. BrIrKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 7.20-.23 (5th ed. 1987) (discussing General Utilities' doctrine and its
repeal). Similarly, tax planners should study I.R.C. § 338 prior to a realty transfer by
corporate merger or aquisition. See generally I.R.C. § 338 (1986).
6. In 1992, Substitute House Bill 2447 proposed eliminating REET's focus on a
19921
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II. AN INTRODUCTION TO REET
A. Welcome to REET Street
Now it is time to sit back, relax, and take a walk down
REET Street.7 Don't worry if at times you feel lost; you will
not have been the first.
In 1951, when the planners developed REET Street, their
vision was to generate revenue for education.' After a period
of serene living on REET Street-no complications, no law
suits, and a relatively straightforward tax statuteg--the time
came to remodel the street's decaying infrastructure. The tax
consequences of REET were increasing as property values rose.
In turn, as those consequences increased, so did the inequities
among taxpayers.
The Washington State Supreme Court completed the first
remodel of REET Street through a series of rulings in the
1950's and 1960's.1' The court's remodel, however, left REET
Street in a state of disrepair. Although the court did the best it
could given the tools available, a few jogs were left in the road.
The court's REET Street enabled some people to sneak by the
tax collector unscathed, while their neighbors were left to pay.
Several years passed before efforts were made to straighten
the now crooked REET Street."
The renovation of REET Street is back on the legislative
docket. But today, there is a new generation of planners striv-
ing to transform REET Street into a viable and equitable reve-
nue-generating community. Similar to the court's experience
"sale" as the taxable event. S.H.B. 2447, 52nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (1992). Instead, the
proposal promoted taxation of any realty "conveyance." Id.
This Comment concludes that by using a realty conveyance as the taxable event,
REET's current failings could be solved. See infra part IX. However, S.H.B. 2447
lacked adequate flexibility for legitimate corporate transfers. Id.
Thus, the 1993 legislature should modify the 1992 version of S.H.B. 2447. For
guidance, the legislature should review certain provisions currently in effect in
Delaware. See infra note 376 and accompanying text. By doing so, the legislature
could solve REET's current failings equitably and effectively.
7. For the reader who lacks a basic understanding of what REET actually is, a
detour to the next section is advised. See infra part II.B.
8. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.45.180 (1989).
9. Id. ch. 82.45.
10. See Christensen v. Skagit County, 66 Wash. 2d 95, 401 P.2d 335 (1965); Estep v.
King County, 66 Wash. 2d 76, 401 P.2d 332 (1965); Doric Co. v. King County, 57 Wash.
2d 640, 358 P.2d 972 (1961); Deer Park Pine Industry, Inc. v. Stevens County, 46 Wash.
2d 852, 286 P.2d 98 (1955).
11. See generally WASH. REv. CODE ch. 82.45A (Supp. 1990-91); see also S.H.B.
2447, 52nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (1992).
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in the 1950's and 1960's, however, the legislature has not
accomplished its goals in one fell swoop. The legislature com-
pleted minor remedial maintenance in 1991,2 but new holes
appeared through the efforts of tax planners who found the
pavement far from impervious. Thus, REET Street remains
plagued with problems.' 3
This story of REET Street has three purposes. First, it
will place the reader back in time and afford a glimpse of how
and why REET Street came to be in its current state of disre-
pair. From this glimpse, the reader can consider the history of
REET, its underlying principles, and its practical applications.
Second, it will permit the reader to view those judicial efforts
responsible for REET Street's current problems. Specifically,
this story explains how a few key court rulings have created a
significant REET loophole affecting transfers of realty made
through corporations and partnerships. Third, it will allow the
reader to review the legislature's latest efforts to rebuild
REET Street, and it will compare those efforts to similar legis-
lation from other states. The reader can then consider
whether REET's renovation is finished, or whether REET
Street's roadbed is still in need of repair. Most likely the
reader will agree with this Comment's conclusion that the leg-
islature's efforts in 1991 only made REET worse, and that
today REET Street is in need of even greater repair than
before.
You, as the reader, might only be interested in certain
aspects of REET. You should, therefore, feel free to go any-
where on REET Street you desire: This Comment is your road
map. Should you desire to learn how REET works today,
begin at Section III. If your interest lies solely in learning how
REET can be manipulated through corporate and partnership
realty transfers, skip to Section IV. And if you are only con-
cerned with the legislature's recent, and potential future
efforts to close the corporate transfer loophole, skip to Section
VI. Enjoy your tour of REET Street.
B. What Is REET?
14
Most states rely on three general types of taxes for reve-
12. See Corporate Transfer Act, 1991 Wash. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 22.
13. A complete discussion of the problems that currently plague Washington
REET can be found infra part V.
14. For additional general background on REET, see RESEARCH DMSION,
1992]
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nue: income, property, and excise taxes. The State of Wash-
ington, however, relies on only two of these; it generates the
bulk of its operating revenue without the use of an income
tax, 5 thereby relying heavily on property and excise taxation.
Generally, excise taxation refers to taxing a specific type of
transaction or privilege. 6 In Washington, most excise taxes
are measured by selling price or some other measure of
income. 1 7 Although Washington's sales tax" and its use tax'9
are categorized as excise taxes, they apply to the'sale and use
of tangible personal property; therefore, real estate sales are
not covered by either tax. Instead, REET covers all statuto-
rily-defined real estate sales2 0 based on the selling price of the
real estate, including the balance of any liens, mortgages, or
other debts.2
For fiscal year 1990, Washington State taxes totalled
nearly $7.0 billion.22 During that period, REET generated
$265.17 million,23 or 3.8 percent of the state's total revenue, not
WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, TAX REFERENCE MANUAL (1991)
[hereinafter TAX REFERENCE MANUAL]; WASHINGTON RESEARCH COUNCIL,
UNDERSTANDING WASHINGTON'S TAXES (1990); RESEARCH DIVISION, WASHINGTON
STATE DEPT. OF REVENUE, TAX ExEmprONS-1990 (1990) [hereinafter TAX
EXEMPTIONS]; WASHINGTON RESEARCH COUNCIL, REAL ESTATE EXCISE TAXES IN
WASHINGTON STATE (1988).
15. Washington is one of seven states that does not impose a personal income tax
along with Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming. Washington
is also one of five states with no corporate net income tax. Of the seven states that do
not levy a personal income tax, Alaska and Florida do tax net corporate income.
Although attempts have been made to reform Washington's tax structure to
include an income tax, those efforts have failed. The most recent attempt was by
Governor Booth Gardner's Committee for Washington's Financial Future, which
proposed an income tax in lieu of a percentage of the existing sales tax. Governor
Gardner proposed that an income tax would generate a more stable revenue source
and would be a more progressive taxing structure than the current regressive sales
tax. However, voter confidence in the proposal failed to muster the necessary majority
for the constitutional amendment required before an income tax could be initiated.
On the other hand, some commentators argue that a constitutional amendment
should not be required in order to create a Washington State income tax. An article
espousing such a view is scheduled to appear in the Winter 1993 issue of this Review.
See Hugh D. Spitzer, Washington State Income Tax-Again?, 16:2 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REV. (1993). Any further discussion on tax reform and its merits is beyond the scope
of this Comment.
16. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 506 (5th ed. 1979).
17. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE Title 82 (1989).
18. Id. ch. 82.08.
19. Id ch. 82.12.
20. Id ch. 82.45.
21. Id § 82.45.030.
22. TAX REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 14, at 6-7.
23. Id.
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including local taxes and state payroll taxes for workers' com-
pensation programs. REET is clearly not the largest cash gen-
erator for Washington State coffers, yet it is considered a
major state tax. It ranked sixth out of thirty-eight tax collec-
tion sources during the 1990 fiscal year.24 The 1990 fiscal year
was an exceptional year for REET collections, reflecting nearly
a fifty percent increase25 over the previous year due to a high
appreciation rate in real estate values and an abnormally large
number of property transactions during that period.26
C A History Lesson
In 1951, when REET Street was originally developed, the
legislature permitted any county to levy an excise tax on real
estate sales, as long as this tax did not exceed one percent of
the selling price. 7 All but one-half of one percent of the pro-
ceeds from the tax were to be placed in the county's school
fund.2' The remaining one-half percent was retained by the
counties to cover administration costs.' The legislature recog-
nized during the 1951 second extraordinary ° session that a
contingency should be added to the statute.3' The contingency
provided state funds when the county tax failed to generate
funding equal to the existing daily school attendance credit.2
The 1951 second extraordinary session also provided an
expanded version of REET that incorporated taxation for the
sale of standing timber and excepted several transactions from
the term "sale."33 But while those transactions were excepted
from the definition of "sale" for REET purposes, the legisla-
ture expanded the definition of "selling price," thereby
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. For example, during fiscal year 1990 there were approximately 282,000 taxable
real estate transactions in Washington, compared to an approximate average of 215,000
in recent years. Id, at 145.
27. Act of Apr. 16, 1951, 1951 Wash. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 11.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Prior to 1991, the Washington State Code Revisor used the designation
"extraordinary session." Since then, that term has been replaced by the designation
"special session."
31. Act of Sept. 6, 1951, 1951 Wash. Laws 2d Spec. Sess. 19.
32. Id.
33. Id. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.45.010 (1989) currently defines the term "sale" and
continues to expressly except several transactions as originally provided for in 1951.
An in depth discussion of the statutorily defined "sale" for REET purposes begins
inmra part III.
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increasing the amount of potential REET revenue.34
In 1955, the legislature exempted partitions of property
and transfers under both divorce decrees and property settle-
ments. 5 In 1959, counties were authorized to levy REET on
conditional sales or purchase options of mining property.'
During the 1967 extraordinary session, the legislature provided
a credit for single family residential property subsequently
transferred within nine months;37 that credit is currently codi-
fied as Revised Code of Washington (RCW) 82.45.105.3" Then,
in 1970, the legislature exempted a transfer to a corporation
wholly owned by the transferor, the transferor's spouse, or the
transferor's children.39
During the late 1970's, funding for basic education had
become recognized as a state responsibility.4° Also becoming a
significant concern was the lack of uniformity in tax collection
by the various counties.41 By 1981, REET was shifted to the
state level for administration.' Despite this shift, county trea-
surers still collect the tax.
In 1982, it was evident to the legislature that REET
needed more bite.43 Consequently, the legislature increased
the state base tax rate to 1.07 percent and authorized the first
two local REET options allowing up to an additional .75 per-
cent.44 In 1987, the legislature repealed the state conveyance
34. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.45.010 (1989).
35. Act of Mar. 14, 1955, 1955 Wash. Laws 132 § 1.
36. Act of Mar. 20, 1959, 1959 Wash. Laws 208 § 1.
37. Act of May 11, 1967, 1967 Wash. Laws Spec. Sess. 149 § 61.
38. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.45.105 (1989).
39. Act of Feb. 24, 1970, 1970 Wash. Laws Spec. Sess. 65 § 1.
40. Seattle School Dist. v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 518, 585 P.2d 71, 95 (1978) (en
banc) (holding that WASH. CONST. art. 9 § I mandates the state sufficiently fund
general public school education).
41. A prior effort to increase uniformity of the counties' administration of the tax
by requiring the Department of Revenue to prescribe rules identifying uniform
minimum standards failed. It was therefore repealed and exchanged for the current
state administration of the tax. See Act of May 11 1967, 1967, Wash. Laws 1st Spec.
Sess. 149, § 3 (effective July 1, 1967) (repealed) (stating that "the department of
revenue is authorized and directed to prescribe minimum standards for uniformity in
reporting, application, and collection of the real estate excise tax .... ").
42. Act of Apr. 1, 1980, 1980 Wash. Laws 154, replaced the county tax with a state
excise tax on sales of real property. Later, 1981 Wash. Laws 93 recodified WASH. REv.
CODE ch. 28A.45 (1979) as WASH. REV. CODE ch. 82.45 (1981).
43. See 1982 Wash. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 49.
44. Id.; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 82.46.010(1) (1989) (providing a .25 percent
local option to be used solely for capital improvements); Id § 82.46.010(2) (providing a
.5 percent local option to be used for general local government purposes). A complete
discussion of the currently existing REET local options can be found infra note 61.
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tax on real property transfers.45 In its place, REET was
increased from 1.07 to 1.28 percent to replace the revenue that
the conveyance tax had previously generated.4 6 In 1987, the
legislature also imposed an additional .06 tax between May 18,
1987, and June 30, 1989, to provide funding for state acquisition
of conservation lands by the Department of Natural
Resources. 47 The latest local REET options were authorized by
the legislature in 1990, providing up to an additional one per-
cent for acquisition of conservation areas48 and up to an addi-
tional 1.25 percent for approved capital improvement
projects.4 9
The most recent legislative change to REET occurred dur-
ing the 1991 legislative session. That change was engrossed
substitute house bill (ESHB) 1831° and concerned the transfer
of real estate by corporations. However, while ESHB 1831 was
aimed at closing an existing REET loophole, the legislation has
not accomplished its goal;5 REET is still a state tax in disre-
pair. But before we explore REET Street's current failings,
there remains a great deal of practical information to address.
D. The Nuts and Bolts
The Washington State Department of Revenue is primar-
ily responsible for administering REET, including the promul-
gation of rules and enforcement actions.5 2  Significantly,
however, county treasurers actually collect the tax and retain
one percent of the state's REET revenue as compensation for
collection costs. 5
3
REET payment must be accompanied by an affidavit form
45. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 82.20 (1985), repealed by 1987 Wash. Laws 472. The
conveyance tax equalled one dollar for each five hundred dollars of equity in real
estate conveyed.
46. Because a portion of the conveyance tax had been dedicated by the 1985
legislature to local governments to maintain public works, an equivalent amount-7.7
percent-of REET revenue is still dedicated to local governments. See WASH. REV.
CODE § 82.45.060(1) (1989).
47. Id. § 82.45.060(2).
48. Id. § 82.46.070 (Supp. 1990-91).
49. Id. §§ 82.46.010, 82.46.035.
50. Corporate Transfer Act, 1991 Wash. Laws 1st Spec. Sess 22 (creating a new
chapter entitled "Excise Tax on Ownership Transfer of a Corporation" codified as
WAH. REV. CODE ch. 82.45A (Supp. 1990-91)).
51. See infra part VI.A for an in depth discussion of E.S.H.B. 1831.
52. WAH. REv. CODE § 82.45.150 (1989).
53. Id. § 82.45.180.
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signed by either the seller or the buyer of the property.-4 The
affidavit memorializes the identifications of the buyer and the
seller, a description of the parcel, the selling price, and other
pertinent information.' In most counties, both payment of the
tax and receipt of the affidavit are conditions to recording the
transfer.56
While the real estate seller is typically liable for REET,
the buyer is ultimately liable if the tax is not paid.57 Further-
more, the one percent county option authorized by RCW
82.46.070 specifically imposes the tax upon the purchaser, not
the seller. Because REET liability provides for a lien that may
be foreclosed by the county, 58 it is in the buyer's best interest
to make sure the tax is paid. 9
The base tax rate, imposed by the state, is 1.28 percent.'
While the tax is primarily a state tax, the legislature has ena-
bled local governments to take advantage of local options for
increasing the tax rate if they desire.6 '
54. The Department of Revenue is required to produce this affidavit pursuant to
WASH. REV. CODE § 82.45.120 (1989). The affidavit can be attained from the depart-
ment or a county treasurer and is currently enumerated as Form Rev. 84-0001 (1988).
For federal tax reporting purposes, Form 1099-S (Proceeds From Real Estate
Transactions) applies to transactions with closing dates after December 31, 1986.
55. Currently, there is some discussion that confusion arising from the buyer's
liability under WASH. REV. CODE § 82.46.070 (Supp. 1990-91) might necessitate an
additional affidavit form or a revision of the one currently being used.
56. GRAHAM H. FERNALD, WASHINGTON STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, REAL PROPERTY
DESKBOOK § 72.66 (2d ed. Supp. 1986 & 1989).
57. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.45.080 (1989).
58. Id §§ 82.45.070, 82.46.040.
59. The tax is due and payable immediately upon sale of the property. Id.
§ 82.45.100. If it is not paid within thirty days after the sale, it will bear interest at the
rate of one percent per month from the date of sale until the date of payment. Id In
addition, if the tax is not received by the county treasurer within thirty days of the due
date, a five percent penalty is assessed; after sixty days, the penalty increases to ten
percent; and after ninety days, it totals twenty percent. Id. Penalties are collected
from the seller only. Id.
60. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.45.060 (1989). Receipts from the state tax are deposited
in the state general fund solely for education of grades kindergarten through high
school and for public works funding. See id (earmarking public works funds); Id-
§ 82.45.180 (earmarking common school funds).
61. Local taxing options include the following:
1. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.46.010(1) (Supp. 1990-91) allows counties and cities
to impose up to an additional .25 percent tax to be used solely for capital
improvements. Because most counties and cities have implemented this
option, the combined state and local REET rate is at least 1.53 percent in
most areas of the state. Washington Tax Guide (CCH) 56-548 (1990)
[hereinafter Tax Guide].
2. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.46.010(2) (Supp. 1990-91) allows counties and cities
to impose up to an additional .5 percent tax, but only if the local
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As just discussed, the amount of REET liability incurred
through a given real estate transaction varies depending on the
local options that are exercised.62 Yet, while REET's rate may
vary, REET is always calculated as a percentage of the selling
price. For REET purposes, selling price is defined in RCW
82.45.030 as the consideration, including money or anything of
value, paid, delivered or contracted to be paid for the transfer
of an interest in real property.' The selling price also includes
the amount of any indebtedness accepted by the purchaser to
secure the purchase of the property.' The selling price does
not, however, include any encumbrances in favor of a govern-
ment entity for taxes or special improvements.65
government does not impose the second .5 percent local sales tax increase
pursuant to WASH. REV. CODE § 82.14.030(2) (1989). By January of 1991, the
city of Clarkston was the only jurisdiction to have chosen this REET
increase, which may be used for general local government purposes. TAX
REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 14, at 143.
3. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.46.070 (Supp. 1990-91) authorizes counties to impose
an additional 1.0 percent tax for the acquisition and maintenance of
conservation areas. The legislature passed this option in 1990, and as of
January 1991, San Juan County was the sole jurisdiction to implement it.
TAX REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 14, at 143. This is the only local
option that, if passed by the county, will also apply in the incorporated
areas within that county. All other local options if levied by the county
will not apply within the county's incorporated areas, and, if levied by
cities, will only apply within that city's limits. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 82.46.010-035 (Supp. 1990-91).
4. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.46.035 (Supp. 1990-91) authorizes counties and cities
to impose up to an additional .25 percent tax to be used solely for capital
projects specified in a comprehensive plan. While this option may be
implemented by the local legislative body in high growth counties, such as
Clark County and the Puget Sound basin, it must receive voter approval in
all other jurisdictions. Id
After considering all of the available local options, there is potential for a com-
bined local and state tax rate of 3.28 percent. Such a rate could spur concerns that a
tax of that magnitude might detrimentally affect the real estate market. See WASHING-
TON NATIONAL TAX SERVICE, PRICE WATERHOUSE, AN ANALYSIS OF STATE AND LOCAL
REAL ESTATE TRANSFER TAXES (1988) (providing an economic analysis of REET).
However, no Washington jurisdiction has implemented the maximum rate. Instead,
the typical current rate for REET remains at 1.53 percent, which includes the state
1.28 percent base rate and the .25 percent local option authorized by WASH. REV. CODE
§ 82.46.010(1) (Supp. 1990-91). See Tax Guide, supra note 61, at 56-548 (providing a
complete table of combined state and local REET rates in Washington State).
62. Local options are discussed supra note 61. For a table of local REET rates
throughout Washington, see Tax Guide, supra note 61, at 56-548.
63. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.45.030 (1989).
64. Id.; see also 51-53 Op. Att'y Gen. 99 (1951) (selling price includes both the
consideration paid or contracted for the assignment of, and any unpaid balance due on,
an assumed contract secured by title on the property).
65. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.45.030 (1989).
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III. WHO PAYS REET ON YOUR STREET? DETERMINING
TAXABLE TRANSACTIONS
For purposes of determining which transactions are taxa-
ble under the REET statute, two sections are of primary
importance: RCW 82.45.030, defining "selling price," and RCW
82.45.010, defining "sale." The statute's definition of sale is
inclusive and includes any transfer of an interest in real prop-
erty, including standing timber, in exchange for "a valuable
consideration."6  The statutory definition of "sale" also
includes any contractual purchase or lease with an option to
purchase when the seller retains title as security for the pay-
ment of the purchase price.' From this inclusive definition of
taxable transactions, the statute lists several exemptions.6
A. Statutory Exemptions
REET's underlying purpose is to tax transactions that con-
stitute sales in open market contexts. Therefore, transfers by
gift,6 9 inheritance,7" divorce decree, foreclosure proceedings,7 1
partition by court order, or condemnation 72 are exempt from
REET liability. The primary beneficiaries of these statutory
exemptions are those who acquire real estate by gift or
inheritance.7 3
66. Id. § 82.45.010.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Some confusion may exist when nominal consideration is granted in a deed by
gift, possibly to diminish warranty deed liability or to furnish support for the
conveyance and insurance against revocability of quit claim deeds. See Annual Survey
of Washington Law, Applicability of Real Estate Sales Tax to Transfers for Benefit of
Unformed Corporation, 41 WASH. L. REv. 583, 585 (1966) [hereinafter Survey]. When
the deed recites nominal consideration such as "for $1 and love and affection," the
issue is whether the transaction was a gift, not whether a dollar actually passed.
Because, in such instances, the recital in the deed is of little assistance, a much better
guide to determine whether the transfer was actually a gift is the seller's affidavit
(Form 84-0001), because that affidavit must disclose under oath the true consideration
given. 53-55 Op. Att'y Gen. 34 (1953).
70. But, if an heir to an undivided interest in real property, which would pass
upon the death of the owner of the land, deeds that interest prior to inheritance, that
transaction is subject to the tax. 51-53 Op. Att'y Gen. 98 (1951).
71. However, assignment of a sheriff's certificate of sale by a purchaser who
requests that the deed be issued to a third person is a taxable assignment. Unlike an
original foreclosure sale, which is exempt, the assignment to a third party is voluntary
and not an exempt conveyance under court order. 57-58 Op. Att'y Gen. 146 (1958).
72. A sale of real property made merely under the pressure of condemnation is
still a taxable transaction. 51-53 Op. Att'y Gen. 59 (1951).
73. And while these exemptions totaled roughly $178 million for the 1989-1991
biennium, it is unlikely that they will be repealed not only because of the tax policy of
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A transfer of a leasehold estate is exempt from REET 4 as
long as it is not a lease with an option to purchase.75 Also
exempt is the forfeiture of a buyer's contract interest in lieu of
foreclosure76 where no consideration otherwise passes.7 An
assignment or sale of a seller's real estate contract,78  a mort-
gage or transfer "merely to secure a debt," and transfers pur-
suant to lien foreclosure proceeding are also expressly exempt
facilitating the underlying transactions, but also because of the difficulty that would
result in establishing equivalent sale prices to calculate the percentage of tax due.
74. See State ex rel. Namer Investment Corp. v. Williams, 73 Wash. 2d 1, 435 P.2d
975 (1968) (upholding the exemption for leasehold transfers); see also WASH. ADMIN.
CODE § 458-61-500 (1989).
75. When a lease option is in question, the transaction is taxable when the
agreement originates, unless (1) the option to purchase must be exercised within two
years after commencement of the lease and the total of the lease payments will not
exceed one-half of the purchase price, or (2) none of the lease payments apply towards
the ultimate selling price. WASH. ADMXN. CODE § 458-61-510 (1989). Furthermore, the
Department of Revenue has the authority to determine the selling price for REET
purposes on leases with options to purchase. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.45.035 (1989). And
although every unexercised lease-option agreement may not be subject to the real
estate excise tax, it does not indicate a failure to tax equally all persons within the
lease option category. Williams, 73 Wash. 2d at 11, 435 P.2d at 981.
Even before the legislature expressly included lease option in the definition of
"sale" pursuant to WASH. REV. CODE § 82.45.010 (1989), the court recognized that it was
consistent with the legislative purpose of the act to include lease options as sales
because, if not, the transaction vehicle could easily be used to evade the tax. Id
76. If the contract contains a proper forfeiture clause, the action is one to forfeit,
and because no consideration passes, no tax is due. However, if the contract fails to
contain a proper forfeiture clause, the seller will be left to foreclose his lien on the
title, which will result in a judgment and sale on the execution of that judgment.
Because the latter constitutes a sale for consideration, whether sold to the original
seller or a third party, that sale has been ruled to be taxable. 51-53 Op. Att'y Gen. 447
(1952).
77. The statute exempts "the assumption by a grantee of the balance owing on an
obligation which is secured by a mortgage of deed in lieu of forfeiture of the vendee's
interest in a contract of sale where no consideration passes otherwise." See 55-57 Op.
Att'y Gen. 95 (1955). If consideration does pass, however, the measure of the tax is the
consideration that passes plus the balance owing on the contract. See 55-57 Op. Att'y
Gen. 141 (1955). There does not appear to be any limitation that the party assuming a
mortgage obligation must be the mortgagor itself. See id, The term "sale" does not
apply to the transfer of a purchaser's contract interest to a third party where no
consideration passes except the obligation to assume the unpaid balance of the
purchase price. 57-58 Op. Att'y Gen. 95 (1957).
While the transfer by the mortgagor to the mortgagee in lieu of foreclosure is not
taxable under WASH. REV. CODE § 82.45.010 (1989), a subsequent resale under contract
to the mortgagor is a taxable transaction even though the resale was part of the
overall agreement to avoid foreclosure. 65-66 Op. Att'y Gen. 47 (1965).
78. Even when accompanied by a warranty deed, the assignment of a seller's
interest in a contract to convey real property is not a taxable transaction where the
sole interest of the assignor is as the seller of an unperformed contract to purchase the
property. 51-53 Op. Att'y Gen. 220 (1952).
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from the definition of sale.79
RCW 82.45.010 further exempts property acquired by and
from government entities, 0 along with conveyances to the
Federal Housing Administration or the Veteran's Administra-
tion under their insurance guaranty contracts. Sales of graves
or lots in established cemeteries are exempt."' And transfers
to a corporation "wholly owned by the transferor, his spouse,
or his children" are not taxable as long as the transferee corpo-
ration does not transfer the property, or as long as the trans-
feror or the transferor's spouse or children do not transfer the
stock, within five years of the original exchange. 2
An additional REET exemption provides a credit for the
amount of tax paid on single family residential property. 3 The
property, however, must be taken in trade for part of the con-
sideration of another single family residence, and the property
must be transferred by a real estate broker or other party
within nine months.' If the second transfer of the property
incurs greater tax liability than the first transfer, only the dif-
ference in REET liability is owed." If, on the one hand, the
tax due on the second transfer is less than the first transfer, no
refund is available."
The REET exemptions, however, are not what make tax
planning of real estate transactions confusing and uncertain.
The difficulty confronting the tax planners working on REET
Street, and the legislators striving to remodel it, lies in deter-
mining what satisfies the statutory requirement that a "sale"
be a transfer for "a valuable consideration." 7 The following
section provides a few examples of how, in practice, REET lia-
bility is incurred.
79. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.45.010 (1989).
80. However, this exemption is of minor impact; it only totalled roughly $9.4
million for the 1989-1991 biennium. TAX EXEMPTIONS, supra note 14, at 189.
81. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.45.010 (1989).
82. Id. (overruling 55-57 Op. Att'y Gen. 25 (1955) (holding that transfer of
property to a corporation for stock issued to a husband and wife as their interests
appear is taxable)).
83. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.45.105 (1989).
84. Id
85. Id.
86. Id; cf. 57-58 Op. Att'y Gen. 70 (1957) (decided before the passage of WASH.
REV. CODE § 82.45.105 (1967)).
87. Id § 82.45.010 (1989).
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B. Specific REET Transactions
The following transactions illustrate REET and several of
its unpredictable applications.s'
1. Concurrent Estates: Is There Consideration?
A brief overview of REET applicability in the context of
concurrent estates89 demonstrates that consideration is the key
to determining whether a transaction is taxable.
At common law, the creation of a joint tenancy required
two real estate transactions: the first transferred title to a
straw person, and the second regranted title to the newly
joined joint tenants. Today, pursuant to RCW 64.28.010, the
first transfer-to a straw person-is no longer necessary.'
The real estate excise tax, however, will not apply in either
case when no consideration is given for the transfers.91 Con-
sider the following joint-tenancy transaction. Brother trans-
fers individually owned real estate in accordance with an
agreement, reciting consideration of love and affection. Pursu-
ant to the agreement, the real estate is transferred to Brother
and Sister as joint tenants. While technically a real estate
transaction has taken place, there has been no exchange for a
valuable consideration and, therefore, there is no tax liability.92
As for a tenancy in common, neither partition of property
"by agreement or as a result of a court decree" is a taxable
transaction because of its express exemption from the defini-
tion of sale.93 However, the exemption in RCW 82.45.010 does
88. The variety of real estate transactions that take place in today's society give
rise to a multitude of questions concerning the applicability of REET. A complete
discussion of all such issues are beyond the scope of this Comment.
Unfortunately, there is no definitive work produced that outlines REET liability
for the myriad of real estate transactions that take place. However, a summary of all
the authoritative materials on the subject has recently been completed and can provide
the tax planner with a reference point from which to start researching a specific issue.
See JUDEE WELLS, REAL ESTATE EXCISE TAX DESKBOOK (1991) (indexing cases,
Washington Tax Determinations, Attorney General Opinions, Excise Tax Bulletins,
and other materials).
89. "Concurrent estates" is defined as the ownership or possession of property by
two or more persons at the same time. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 264 (5th ed. 1979).
90. WASH. REV. CODE § 64.28.010 (1987). WASH. REV. CODE § 64.28.010 states that a
joint tenancy "may be created by a single agreement, transfer, deed, will or other
instrument from a sole owner to himself and others .. "
91. See WASH. REV. CODE § 82.45.010 (1989) (defining a taxable sale as a transfer of
ownership "for a valuable consideration").
92. 61-62 Op. Att'y Gen. 86 (1961).
93. WASH. REv. CODE § 82.45.010 (1989). This express exemption was created by
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not cover a sale, as opposed to merely the partition, of that
property. 4 If the property is sold pursuant to an action to par-
tition property owned by tenants in common, the transaction is
a taxable sale.9 5 Therefore, when one of the joint purchasers
of the property voluntarily transfers his or her interest in a
contract sale to the remaining purchaser, that transfer is a tax-
able transaction.9 The selling price, for REET purposes, will
be the consideration delivered in return for the transfer.
9 7
That consideration is measured by the selling price paid for the
transferring purchaser's equity, plus the proportional share of
the unpaid balance owed by the transferring purchaser at the
time of the transfer.9"
In sum, the key to determining REET liability in the con-
text of joint tenancies and tenancies in common is to deter-
mine if consideration has actually passed between the fee
owners.
2. Trusts
When transfers involving trusts are at issue, once again, it
is important to remember that REET requires consideration in
exchange for a transfer of ownership in real estate before tax
liability arises. Therefore, REET does not apply to a transfer
of real property from the owner into a trust for that same
owner because the transfer does not constitute a sale under
RCW 82.45.010. 9 Neither naming beneficiaries nor reserving
the right to revoke the trust should have any bearing on the
lack of consideration for such transactions. 1°° A trustee may
also hold property for a corporation not yet in existence when
the trust is established. Then, once the corporation is formed
and the trustee transfers the realty to the corporation, the
transaction will not constitute a taxable sale.1' 1
For example, in Senfour Investment Co. v. King County,0 2
amendment following 51-53 Op. Att'y Gen. 98 (1951), and it clearly supersedes
Attorney General's ruling that partition actions constitute taxable transactions.
94. Id.
95. 57-58 Op. Att'y Gen. 8 (1957).
96. 65-66 Op. Att'y Gen. 64 (1965).
97. WAsH. REV. CODE § 82.45.030 (1989).
98. Id.
99. 1& § 82.45.010.
100. Id.
101. Senfour Investment Co. v. King County, 66 Wash. 2d 67, 401 P.2d 319 (1965);
see also 61-62 Op. Att'y Gen. 133 (1962).
102. 66 Wash. 2d 67, 401 P.2d 319 (1965).
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a corporate promoter entered into an agreement to purchase
real estate on behalf of an unformed corporation. 0 3 Upon the
date of closing, the corporation had not yet been completely
formed.' °4 To avoid losing the property, the promoter and two
nominees purchased the property as trustees.105 The seller
paid the real estate excise tax because the transaction was
clearly a sale as defined by the tax."° One month later the
corporation was completely formed. Pursuant to the trust
agreement the three trustees transferred the realty to the cor-
poration by quit claim deed, reciting nominal consideration. 10 7
King County assessed a tax on the transfer, alleging that it was
a second sale.108 The tax was assessed to the trustees who
were also the corporation's officers.0'9 The trustees, in turn,
paid in protest and filed suit claiming that the transfer to the
newly formed corporation did not constitute a second transac-
tion for tax purposes.110 The court agreed and held that where
failure to complete the incorporation process before the closing
date forces the incorporators to accept the property in trust for
the corporation, the transfer from the trustees to the newly
formed corporation does not constitute a taxable sale."'
Thus, realty transfers made through trusts provide
another example of the role that consideration plays in invok-
ing REET; namely, nominal consideration is insufficient.
3. Standing Timber: Who Says It's Realty?
While consideration is a prerequisite for determining
whether a sale is a taxable transaction, it is also important to
remember that REET applies solely to the transfer of real
property and does not apply to personal property transactions.
Nevertheless, as in the case of standing timber, not everyone
agrees on the definition of real property.
Prior to the passage of REET in 1951, timber sales, which
required immediate severance of the timber, were not taxable
sales of real estate.1" 2 However, following the statute's pas-
103. Id. at 68, 401 P.2d at 320.
104. Id
105. Id.
106. Id; see WASH. REv. CODE § 82.45.010 (1989).




111. Id. at 70, 401 P.2d at 321.
112. See 51-53 Op. Att'y Gen. 234 (1952).
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sage, all sales of standing timber after September 6, 1951,
became subject to REET.113
By taxing standing timber, the statute is potentially incon-
sistent. The Washington Supreme Court has stated that when
a contract for the sale of standing timber provides for immedi-
ate severance, the timber itself is personal property and not
real property."4 Because REET taxes the transfer of "real
property, '""' one could reasonably conclude that a sale of
standing timber should not be subject to REET if the timber is
intended to be immediately severed. However, the REET stat-
ute was expressly amended to include standing timber within
the definition of sale," 6 thereby creating an inconsistency, but
clearly making the sale of standing timber a taxable
transaction."1
7
When considering REET liability in a timber transac-
tion," 8 therefore, the requirements for "consideration""' 9 and
the statutory definition of "sale"' 2 should be considered. Sig-
nificantly, the character of the timber in question should also
be considered. For instance, one should ask whether the tim-
113. Id. Pursuant to New York State's Real Estate Transfer Tax, a transfer of
standing timber is also taxed as a realty transfer. Adopted Regulation, 1990 N.Y. Tax
LEXIS 523, at *4 (N.Y. Comm'r Tax & Fin. Oct. 22, 1990) (providing regulations
promulgated pursuant to N.Y. TAx LAWS §§ 171, 1407, 1415(a), 1416(a), 1419(b)
(Consol. 1990)). An analysis of New York's Realty Transfer Tax can be found infra
part VII.A.
114. Elmonte Investment Co. v. Schafer Bros. Logging Co., 192 Wash. 1, 72 P.2d
511 (1937); see also Ralph W. Johnson, Washington Timber Deeds and Contracts, 32
WASH. L. REV. 30 (1957) (discussing confusion surrounding the sale of standing timber
in real property law).
115. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.45.010 (1989).
116. Id.
117. It has been argued that this inconsistency may be of constitutional magnitude
under WASH. CONST. art. 2, § 19, providing that "[n]o bill shall embrace more than one
subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." Lawrence P. Gamroth, Comment,
Washington Real Estate Excise Tax: An Analysis and a Survey, 3 GONz. L. REV. 89, 93
(1968) (citing YMCA v. Washington, 62 Wash. 2d 504, 506, 383 P.2d 497, 499 (1966), for
support). However, this argument is misfounded because inclusion of standing timber
in WASH. REV. CODE § 82.45.010 (1989) concerns a statute, as opposed to merely a bill.
While the statute embraces more than one subject, the statute is a collection of several
bills that have been passed over several years. See also State ex rel Namer v. Williams,
73 Wash. 2d 1, 435 P.2d 976 (1968) (holding that REET taxation of a lease-option is
constitutionally violative).
118. A complete in-depth analysis of Washington's taxation of timber transfers is
beyond the scope of this Comment. For a more in-depth analysis of Washington's
timber tax, see JOHN CONKLIN, RESEARCH DIVISION, WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT
OF REVENUE, A REVIEW OF FOREST TAXATION IN WASHINGTON (1980).
119. The consideration requirement under REET is discussed supra part III.
120. The statutory definition of a "sale" under REET is discussed supra part III.
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ber should be severed before or after the closing of the sale.' 2 '
Thus, standing timber sales provide an opportunity to
study another significant REET principle. While the transfer
of consideration is one underlying principle of REET, so is the
principle that the tax is imposed on the sale of real property
(as defined by RCW 82.45.010), not personal property.
IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF CORPORATE REAL ESTATE
TRANSFERS BETWEEN 1955 AND 1991:
A LOOPHOLE IS FORMED
As illustrated above, consideration is the root for deter-
mining the taxability of REET transactions. Specifically, the
taxability of individual transactions under REET is based on a
transfer "for a valuable consideration.' 1 22 Significantly, how-
ever, the courts, the Attorney General, and the Department of
Revenue have all experienced difficulty in determining what
kind of transactions provide adequate consideration to invoke
the tax.123 It seems clear that nominal consideration 124 for a
transfer will not invoke the tax.' 25 One might also conclude
121. "It should be noted that what we have said [that a contract or conveyance of
standing timber is taxable even if it contemplates immediate severance] applies to sales
which pass title while the timber is standing." 51-53 Op. Att'y Gen. 234 (1952)
(emphasis added). In addition, it should be noted that where blown down timber is
substantially severed from the real property, it becomes tangible personal property
and REET does not apply. See Tax Guide, supra note 59, at 56-508 n.881.
122. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.45.010 (1989) (defining sale); id. § 82.45.030 (defining
selling price).
123. "Determining what constitutes a conveyance of an interest in real property
for valuable consideration has been a prime problem in administering the tax."
Gordon G. Conger, Note, County Imposed Real Estate Excise Tax-Applicability to
Corporate Transfers and Dissolution, 37 WASH. L. REV. 219, 220 (1962) (discussing the
administrative difficulties of the tax when solely administered by the counties;
however, simply because the state now administers the tax, the same problem exists).
124. To hold that a horse, hawk, or robe is sufficient, in and of itself, to assess a
tax on a real estate transaction would ignore that nothing was bargained for the
exchange. "Consideration must actually be bargained for as exchange for the
promise." RESTATEMENT OF THE LAWS OF CONTRACTS § 75 cmt. b (1932); see also
Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp v. DeLisle, 47 Wash. 2d 318, 287 P.2d 302 (1955); Snyder v.
Roberts, 45 Wash. 2d 865, 278 P.2d 348 (1955).
Furthermore, because transfers of real property can be accomplished without the
recitation of even nominal consideration, assessing REET simply because nominal
consideration is part of the transaction would only create a trap for the unwary.
Survey, supra note 69, at 583-85.
125. See, e.g., Senfour Investment Co. v. King County, 66 Wash. 2d 61, 401 P.2d 319
(1965) (holding that nominal consideration for the transfer of property from a trust to
a newly formed corporation does not invoke the tax); see also 53-55 Op. Att'y Gen. 34
(1953) (ruling that nominal consideration reciting "$1 and love and affection" does not
destroy the express gift exemption of WASH. REV. CODE § 82.45.010).
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that, for REET purposes, "the essence of a 'transfer'... is the
passage of control over the economic benefits of property
rather than any technical changes in its title." '26 Nevertheless,
the consideration difficulty has forced the courts to create
some rather inconsistent rules concerning particular types of
real estate transfers. The most noticeable inconsistency
involves realty transfers by corporations and partnerships. In
this type of transfer, a loophole in REET has emerged where
corporations and partnerships are used as the real estate trans-
fer vehicle. 27
Ordinarily, there is no conveyance for a valuable consider-
ation where change of title is effected solely as a result of its
distribution to the stockholders of a solvent corporation in the
process of dissolution. 28 The court determined, however, in
Deer Park Pine Industry, Inc. v. Stevens County, 29 that where
a voluntary assumption of the liabilities of a dissolving corpora-
tion by the stockholders occurs, the transaction is a taxable
conveyance to the extent of the assumed debt."s
While the court found the realty transaction in Deer Park
subject to REET,' 3' the court's reasoning created the founda-
tion for a trilogy of cases 32 that later made it possible to avoid
REET by transferring realty as a corporate asset. The follow-
ing subsections outline the steps the court took in creating that
loophole.
A. Step One: Deer Park Pine Industry, Inc.
v. Stevens County
In Deer Park,'33 two corporations acquired one hundred
percent of the stock in a Washington corporation known as the
North Columbia Corporation.34 The first corporation, Deer
Park Pine Industry, acquired three-fourths of North Colum-
126. Survey, supra note 69, at 584-85 (quoting dictum Sanford's Estate v.
Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 43 (1939)).
127. Specific examples of corporate and partnership real estate transfers resulting
in past REET avoidance can be found infra part V.B.
128. Estep v. King County, 66 Wash. 2d 76, 401 P.2d 332 (1965).
129. 46 Wash. 2d 852, 286 P.2d 98 (1955).
130. I at 857, 286 P.2d at 100 (limiting REET liability, based on assumption of
corporate debts, to the value of the realty transferred).
131. Id. at 860, 286 P.2d at 102.
132. Estep, 66 Wash. 2d 76, 401 P.2d 332; Doric Co. v. King County, 57 Wash. 2d
640, 358 P.2d 972 (1961); Deer Park, 46 Wash. 2d 852, 286 P.2d 98.
133. 46 Wash. 2d 852, 286 P.2d 98.
134. Id. at 853, 286 P.2d at 99.
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bia's stock. 3 The second corporation, Chicago and Riverside
Lumber Company, acquired the remaining one-fourth stock
interest.1 36  While the opinion does not provide an entire
breakdown of the assets of North Columbia Corporation, it
does note that the newly acquired stock represented certain
real property. 137 Both acquisitions took place in March of
1950.138
In December of 1953, the shareholders of North Columbia
Corporation resolved to liquidate the corporation.1 3 9 Upon dis-
solution they quitclaimed the realty owned by North Columbia
to its shareholders. 40 Based on the resulting real estate trans-
action, Stevens County assessed REET on Deer Park Pine
Industry. 4' Deer Park Pine Industry subsequently filed suit to
determine whether distribution of realty to the stockholders
pursuant to liquidation was a taxable transaction.14 A number
of law firms filed a lengthy amicus curiae brief arguing two
principal points. 43 First, the brief's authors argued that
because nothing was bargained for by the stockholders who
received the realty, the dissolution transaction did not consti-
tute a "conveyance for valuable consideration."'" Second, the
brief's authors argued that title automatically vested in the
shareholders after certain unilateral acts of the corporation.
As such, the dissolution transaction was merely satisfaction of
the shareholders' preexisting rights. 45
In resolving the issue, the court looked specifically to the
REET statute's definition of sale."~ That definition contained
two important phrases: "Sale shall have its ordinary meaning
and shall in addition include any conveyance.., for a valuable
consideration."' 47 After reviewing the statutory definition of




138. Deer Park, 46 Wash. 2d at 853, 286 P.2d at 99.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 853-54, 286 P.2d at 99.
141. Id. at 854, 286 P.2d at 99.
142. Id.
143. Arnicus Curiae Brief, Deer Park Pine Industry, Inc. v. Stevens County, 46
Wash. 2d 852, 286 P.2d 98 (No. 33201) (1955).
144. Id.
145. Id.
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The science of semantics would be stretched beyond permis-
sible limits to conclude that the transaction under examina-
tion constitutes a sale in "its ordinary meaning." If the
event is a taxable one, it must be such because it constitutes
a "conveyance.. . for a valuable consideration."'148
The court went on to state:
There is no conveyance for a valuable consideration ...
where a change of title to real property is effected solely as a
result of its distribution to stockholders of a solvent corpora-
tion in the process of dissolution, except as hereafter noted.
The change in title is but fruition of a right which accrued to
the stockholder at the time the stock was acquired. 1
49
The court then limited its determination by concluding that
when the shareholders also accept the liabilities of the dissolv-
ing corporation, those liabilities constitute consideration."5
Because Deer Park was a case of first impression in Wash-
ington, and because no other state courts had addressed an
analogous issue, the court turned to the somewhat similar fed-
eral documentary stamp tax' 5' for guidance.5 2 Specifically,
the court relied heavily on two federal cases that considered
whether a realty transfer through corporate dissolution consti-
tutes a sale and a conveyance for consideration under the fed-
eral documentary stamp tax.153  Those cases both held that
when the stockholders assumed the liabilities of the liquidating
corporation, the stamp tax was applicable to the extent of the
liabilities assumed up to the value of the real property trans-
ferred.M As a result, the Deer Park court accepted that the
assumption of a liquidating corporation's liabilities by its share-
holders constitutes consideration within the definition of sale
under RCW 82.45.010.15 The amount of consideration trans-
ferred for determining the amount of tax due pursuant to the
definition of "selling price" in RCW 82.45.030 is the value of
148. Deer Park, 46 Wash. 2d at 855, 286 P.2d at 100 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE
§ 28A.45.010 (1955)).
149. Id. at 857, 286 P.2d at 100 (citing United States v. Niagara Hudson Power
Corp., 53 F. Supp. 796, 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1944)) (emphasis added).
150. Deer Park, 46 Wash. 2d at 859, 286 P.2d at 102.
151. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3480, 3482 (1952) (repealed). The federal stamp tax was levied on
instruments of writing that conveyed real estate to a purchaser. Id.
152. Deer Park, 46 Wash. 2d at 857-58, 286 P.2d at 101.
153. Greyhound Corp. v. United States, 208 F.2d 858 (7th Cir. 1954); R.H. Macy &
Co. v. United States, 107 F. Supp 833 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
154. Greyhound, 208 F.2d at 860; Macy, 107 F. Supp. at 885.
155. Deer Park, 46 Wash. 2d at 859, 286 P.2d at 102.
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the liabilities assumed.'5
Although the Deer Park court upheld the tax in a corpo-
rate dissolution, it noted that the "[a]ssumption of the debts of
a liquidating corporation by the stockholders is purely volun-
tary.' 5 7 Thus, on the basis of this holding, the foundation was
laid for the creation of a loophole. Namely, a person could
avoid REET by buying the stock of a corporation and then dis-
solving the corporation to obtain the land, while not assuming
any of the liquidating corporation's liability. Such a transac-
tion was analyzed by the court in Doric Co. v. King County.5
B. Step Two: Doric Co. v. King County
In Doric, the plaintiff acquired all of the outstanding stock
of a corporation in 1958.' The sole asset of the newly
acquired corporation was an apartment building in Seattle
known as the Grosvenor House."6 When the plaintiff acquired
the Grosvenor House, it was valued at $5,100,000 and was
encumbered by a mortgage securing a $2,550,000 note.
161
In that same year, proceedings for dissolution of the corpo-
ration were commenced by the plaintiff as the sole stock-
holder, and a trustee was appointed to proceed with the
dissolution.6 2 As a result of that dissolution, the plaintiff
received a warranty deed to the Grosvenor House.16 3 Although
the warranty deed contained a statement that the "property is
conveyed subject to a lien of real property mortgage executed
by... [the corporation as mortgagor to the mortgagee,]" the
plaintiff did not assume the mortgage obligation.' The mort-
gagee was never notified of the dissolution; after distribution,
the plaintiff made all the payments on the note out of income
from the operation of the Grosvenor House."
King County assessed REET on the transfer to the plain-
tiff, arguing that Deer Park made it implicit that a stockholder
agrees to assume the corporate liabilities due to the very
156. WA SH. REV. CODE § 82.45.030 (1989).
157. Deer Park, 46 Wash. 2d at 859, 286 P.2d at 102.
158. 57 Wash. 2d 640, 358 P.2d 972 (1961).




163. Doric, 57 Wash. 2d at 642, 358 P.2d at 973.
164. Id. at 642-43, 358 P.2d at 973.
165. Id. at 643, 358 P.2d at 973.
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nature of a distribution of assets in furtherance of dissolu-
tion."' Although the Doric court accepted that Deer Park gov-
erned the case, it disagreed with King County. The court
stated as follows:
We are not willing to depart from this reasoning [in Deer
Park]. We found the distribution in the Deer Park case was
a taxable event because the stockholders had agreed by con-
tract to assume the corporate liabilities in consideration for
the trustee's undertaking to distribute [to them] the corpo-
rate assets in kind.. . . Unlike the Deer Park case, the
instant case contains no agreement by the stockholders to
assume any corporate liabilities.'
67
Therefore, based on the reasoning in Deer Park, and
because the plaintiff had not accepted any of the corporation's
liabilities, the Grosvenor House was transferred to the plaintiff
without incurring REET liability. " ' Using Deer Park's founda-
tion for a loophole, the court in Doric continued the building
process. Only one case remained before the court would
totally disregard a REET transaction's substance by looking
solely to the transaction's form.
C. Step Three: Estep v. King County
Estep v. King County169 is the final case in the corporate
loophole trilogy. In Estep, a corporation's stockholders con-
tracted and sold all of their stock to the plaintiffs.7 0 The
purchase price of the stock was payable in installments over a
number of years.17 ' Less than three months later, the plain-
tiffs, as shareholders, voted to dissolve their newly purchased
corporation and appointed a statutory liquidating trustee.72
That trustee, in turn, dissolved the corporation and presented
the shareholders with a quitclaim deed for the realty owned by
the newly purchased corporation. 173 Upon presentation of the
deed to King County for recording, the county assessed REET
on the sale. 74 The shareholders paid the tax in protest and
166. Id. at 645, 358 P.2d at 975.
167. Id. at 645, 358 P.2d at 974.
168. Doric, 57 Wash. 2d at 646, 358 P.2d at 975.
169. 66 Wash. 2d 76, 401 P.2d 332 (1965).




174. Estep, 66 Wash. 2d at 78, 401 P.2d at 333.
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commenced a refund action.-75
The county claimed that despite Deer Park and Doric, the
Estep transaction was distinguishable and, thus, taxable.'76
The shareholders originally acquired the corporation's shares
for the purpose of transferring the real estate. Less than three
months later, the shareholders dissolved the corporation to
avoid the real estate excise tax. 77 The county claimed that it
would be error for the court not to recognize the two separate
transactions as a single transaction for the sale of real estate.
178
In support of their argument, the county relied on the
Kimbell-Diamond rule, 179 as explained in United States v.
Mattison :180
When a taxpayer who is interested primarily in a corpora-
tion's assets first purchases the stock and then liquidates the
corporation in order to acquire the desired assets, the sepa-
rate steps taken to accomplish the primary objective will be
treated as a single objective. Thus, even though the objec-
tive was accomplished in form by a purchase of stock, the
substance of the transaction is a purchase of property.
181
The court, however, declined to adopt the Kimble-Dia-
mond rule for real estate transactions. Specifically, the court
declined on the basis that the rule would require the counties
and courts to search for subjective intent every time a transfer
of stock was followed by a transfer of real property during cor-
porate dissolution. 8 2 The court further stated that if any
future change in the application of the REET statute was to
occur, it would have to be by legislative mandate.8 3
While Estep took Deer Park to its limit, Justice Finley dis-
sented. Justice Finley expressed his concern that complex cor-
porate principles were being used to interpret a statute that
defines a taxable sale as a sale within the "ordinary mean-
175. Id.
176. Id. at 79, 401 P.2d at 334.
177. Id. at 77, 401 P.2d at 333.
178. Id. at 79, 401 P.2d at 334.
179. Estep, 66 Wash. 2d at 79, 401 P.2d at 334 (citing M. L. Cross, Annotation,
Income Tax: Corporate Assets as Received in Liquidation or by Purchase Where Stock
is Purchased to Acquire Assets, 83 A.L.R.2d 718 (1962)).
180. 273 F.2d 13 (9th Cir. 1959).
181. Estep, 66 Wash. 2d at 79, 401 P.2d at 334 (citing United States v. Mattison, 273
F.2d 13 (9th Cir. 1959)).
182. Id. at 80, 401 P.2d at 334.
183. Id. at 80, 401 P.2d at 335.
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ing' ' 4 of the term.8 5 And "when an incorporator has sold his
stock to another party who receives land upon the dissolution
of the corporation... there has been a sale within the ordinary
meaning of that term."'"8 Nevertheless, the majority in Estep
disagreed and concluded that the transfer of ownership was
not subject to REET. The loophole was complete and it would
only take time to realize it.
D. After the Fact Affirmation: Ban-Mac Inc. v. King County
and Weaver v. King County
While King County received a supportive vote in Justice
Finley's dissent, the County nonetheless lost the battle in
Estep. However, King County was not prepared to accept that
the Estep court's reasoning left an obvious loophole in its wake.
Instead, King County returned to the Washington State
Supreme Court twice more to litigate the issue.8 7 And both
times, King County was unsuccessful.
King County's first attempt to find a way around Deer
Park, as stated in Estep, was Ban-Mac Inc. v. King County.
While King County asserted that the facts in Ban-Mac were
sufficiently different from previous cases, the court disagreed.
In fact, the court found the facts presented in Ban-Mac so
inconsequential to its affirmation of the Deer Park rationale,
that the opinion expressly forgoes mentioning any of those
facts.8 9 Nevertheless, in reaching its judgment in Ban-Mac,
the court finally acknowledged that as a result of Deer Park
and its progeny,19° there was an obvious means to avoid REET
on certain real estate transactions:
As the law now stands, a sizeable loophole exists when a
person buys the stock of an existing corporation and then
dissolves the corporation to obtain the land. However, this
184. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.45.010 (1989) (defining the term "sale" for REET
purposes as having its "ordinary meaning").
185. Estep, 66 Wash. 2d at 80, 401 P.2d at 335 (Finley, J., dissenting).
186. Id.
187. Weaver v. King County, 73 Wash. 2d 183, 437 P.2d 698 (1968); Ban-Mac, Inc. v.
King County, 69 Wash. 2d 49, 416 P.2d 694 (1966).
188. 69 Wash. 2d 49, 416 P.2d 694 (1966).
189. Id. at 50, 416 P.2d at 695. For the purposes of this discussion, those facts are
not important either.
190. Christensen v. Skagit County, 66 Wash. 2d 95, 401 P.2d 335 (1965); Estep v.
King County, 66 Wash. 2d 76, 401 P.2d 332 (1965); Doric Co. v. King County, 57 Wash.
2d 640, 358 P.2d 972 (1961); Deer Park Pine Industry, Inc. v. Stevens County, 46 Wash.
2d 852, 286 P.2d 98 (1955).
[Vol. 16:463
Washington's Real Estate Excise Tax
loophole may be of minimal importance, and it is possible
that this exception has been purposefully left on the books
by the legislature. Deer Park was handed down in 1955, and
the legislature has done nothing to the statute [since
then] .... 191
Despite acknowledging the loophole, the Ban-Mac court
refused to grant King County's request to judicially close the
loophole. The court concluded that because the legislature had
not amended the REET statute in the eleven years following
Deer Park, the legislature's inaction was tantamount to acqui-
escence of the newly created loophole.1 9 2 Moreover, because
the Washington State Constitution 9 3 places taxation matters
within the province of the legislature, the court concluded that
to overrule Deer Park would violate the separation of powers
doctrine.194
After Ban-Mac, King County made one final assault on
Deer Park in Weaver v. King County.'9 5 Once again, the court
refused the county's request to tax the actual substance of a
corporate real estate transaction, stating that any future rever-
sal of the Deer Park rationale would be left to legislative
action.196 The court also refused King County's newly formu-
lated argument that was based on the specific facts of
Weaver.
1 97
In Weaver, the realty in question was valued at $400,000
and was encumbered by a mortgage with an unpaid balance of
$46,000.198 That realty was acquired by the grantee as an asset
of a newly acquired corporation. 1' Six months after this
acquisition, the grantee decided to dissolve the newly acquired
corporation. 2° ° As a result, the liquidating trustee of the corpo-
ration delivered to the grantee a statutory warranty deed con-
veying the realty subject to the unpaid mortgage.20 ' King
191. Ban-Mac, 69 Wash. 2d at 51, 416 P.2d at 695.
192. Id.
193. WASH. CONST., art. VII, § 1.
194. Ban-Mac, 69 Wash. 2d at 51, 416 P.2d at 695. Today, the validity of such an
argument may be questioned in light of recent legislative efforts to close the loophole
created by the court in Deer Park. See inf ra Part VI for an overview of recent
legislative efforts to close the Deer Park loophole.
195. 73 Wash. 2d 183, 437 P.2d 698 (1968).
196. Id. at 184 n.1, 437 P.2d at 699 n.1.
197. Id. at 186, 437 P.2d at 700.
198. Id. at 185, 437 P.2d at 700.
199. Id.
200. Weaver, 73 Wash. 2d at 185, 437 P.2d at 700.
201. Id,
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County argued that if the court would not alter its position
from Deer Park, it should at least find the transaction taxable
to the extent that the grantee took the property "subject to" a
mortgage of $46,000.202 The court, however, disagreed and
stated as follows:
The grantee of a deed is not bound by the mortgagor's cove-
nant binding himself and his successors to pay the mortgage
debt, even though the mortgage declares that the covenant
runs with the land, unless the grantee has, in some way
other than mere acceptance of the deed, assumed the mort-
gage indebtedness.
20 3
After Weaver, King County gave up on the court; it was
obvious that the legislature would be its sole refuge.
E. An Added Twist: Christensen v. Skagit County
After studying the court's treatment of REET in the con-
text of corporate dissolution proceedings, one begins to feel
that any real estate transaction involving a corporation is free
from REET liability. However, the court maintained one
obstacle to total REET avoidance. In Christensen v. Skagit
County,204 the court ruled that while a dissolving corporation
could transfer realty tax free, realty transferred into a newly
created corporation in exchange for corporate stock was
taxable. °5
The plaintiffs in Christensen were three partners who
owned three separate supermarkets.2' Desiring to do business
in corporate form, the partners organized three separate corpo-
rations and transferred all of the partnership assets, including
the real property, to the corporations.20 7 In each instance, the
partners were the only incorporators and the only sharehold-
ers.20 8 Once the transaction was complete, Skagit County
required REET payment before the county would record the
deeds conveying the real property.20 9 The plaintiffs paid under
protest and filed suit to recover the tax paid.210 "The only
202. Id.
203. Id. at 186, 437 P.2d at 700-01.
204. 66 Wash. 2d 95, 401 P.2d 335 (1965).
205. Id, at 97-98, 401 P.2d at 337.
206. Id. at 95, 401 P.2d at 336.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Christensen, 66 Wash. 2d at 95-96, 401 P.2d at 336.
210. Id.
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[issue was] whether the... tax applie[d] to conveyances of real
property by members of a partnership to a corporation in
return for the issuance of corporate stock.
'2 1 '
The Christensen court recognized that the issue, as in Deer
Park and its progeny, was whether a "sale" for REET purposes
included the transfer in question.212 Because the Christensen
plaintiffs saw their transaction as the inverse of the Doric
transfer, in which a dissolving corporation transferred realty to
a partnership tax free, they claimed by inverse analogy that
they did not owe the tax.213 The court refuted the argument,
stating:
Even though it might be said that the transfer of real prop-
erty to a corporation in return for stock is at the opposite
end of the spectrum from a transfer of real property by a liq-
uidating trustee to the shareholders [the Deer Park transac-
tion], there the analogy ends. Each transaction is based on a
different legal theory.
2 14
The Christensen court also disagreed that a transfer of real
property from a partnership to a corporation was merely "tak-
ing it out of one pocket and putting it in another. 2 1 - Instead,
the court concluded that the newly formed corporations were
separate organizations with different privileges and liabilities
from those enjoyed by the plaintiffs prior to incorporation.1 6
The court further concluded that the transaction was a sale for
"a valuable consideration," because the partnership sold its
real property for "the right to do business in the corporate
211. Id. at 96, 401 P.2d at 336.
212. Id.
213. I& at 97, 401 P.2d at 337. The same assumption was made in a law review
Note following Deer Park. See Conger, supra note 124, at 225 n.30. That article stated:
It was decided in Deer Park that when a corporation is dissolved, the
termination of the rights incident to the ownership of stock was not
"consideration" for the right to direct ownership of the asset by
distribution .... The court may well determine, based upon this that the
reverse procedure should be treated in the same fashion: that is, that the
termination of direct ownership in an asset is not "consideration" for the
rights incident to the ownership of stock received by the individual, and thus
no taxable "sale" occurred.
This same passage is used as support in Justice Finley's dissent in Christensen, 66
Wash. 2d at 99, 401 P,2d at 338 (dissenting opinion discussed infra text accompanying
notes 224-28).
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form.
,9 2 1 7
Justice Finley maintained the philosophy he espoused in
Estep, stating that the Christensen court had once again missed
the true mandate of the tax due to the "color of Deer Park...
and... Doric. '' ms Justice Finley believed that a taxable trans-
action was meant to be a "transfer of the ownership"2 9 and
that in Christensen no transfer had truly taken place. Justice
Finley also declined to accept the majority's position that the
right to do business in corporate form constituted "a valuable
consideration. '220 Justice Finley recognized that if Christen-
sen-type transactions were not taxable, then the tax could be
completely avoided.22 ' However, Justice Finley felt that the
underlying problem was Deer Park and its progeny, not Chris-
tensen-type transactions. 2 And, as we shall see in the follow-
ing pages, Justice Finley's position was sound.
The holding in Christensen does appear to be inconsistent
with Deer Park and its progeny," just as Justice Hale pointed
out in his dissent in Weaver v. King County :224
Christensen v. King County . .. in my opinion, departed
from the rationale of the earlier cases and thus cast some
doubt on Deer Park and its successors.... In my mind, how-
ever, the rationale of Christensen comes closer to carrying
out the intention of the legislature than do the other cases.
The issues, as I see them, are quite simple.... If the trans-
fers are for a valuable consideration, they are taxable sales
under the pertinent statutes ... 2 [Both a] transfer of real
estate from a dissolved corporation to its stockholders [like
in Deer Park and its progeny] .... or from partners to a cor-
poration in which the grantor will own the capital stock [like
in Christensen] ... appear to me abundantly supported by
consideration and should be held taxable as a sale of real
217. Id at 98, 401 P.2d at 337.
218. Id. at 99, 401 P.2d at 338 (Finley, J., dissenting).
219. Christensen, 66 Wash. 2d at 99, 401 P.2d at 338; see WASH. REv. CODE
§ 82.45.010 (1989).
220. Christensen, 66 Wash. 2d at 99, 401 P.2d at 338.
221. Id. at 102, 401 P.2d at 339. For example, Able, a landowner, could incorporate
and transfer his realty to a newly-created corporation in which he owns one hundred
percent of the stock. Then, Able could sell his stock in the corporation to Buyer, who
would later dissolve the corporation and receive the realty without REET liability.
222. Id.
223. See cases cited supra note 190.
224. 73 Wash. 2d 183, 187, 437 P.2d 698, 701 (1968) (Hale, J., dissenting) (majority
opinion discussed supra in text accompanying notes 195-203).
225. Id. at 187-88, 437 P.2d at 701.
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estate .... 226 I see no difference in principal as far as the
doctrine of consideration is concerned between conveyances
to or from newly organized corporations and conveyances
from a dissolving one ....227
However, while the opinion in Christensen may have been
inconsistent with Deer Park, the court had little choice but to
find the Christensen transaction taxable. As Justice Finley
pointed out in his dissent, had the Christensen court not
upheld the tax, the tax could have been completely avoided.
Although the court could have overruled Deer Park, as we
have seen, it was far from willing to do so. And while the
inconsistency between Christensen and Deer Park brought
Deer Park's rationale into question, the court refused to over-
turn Deer Park in future cases.228
V. PROBLEMS ON REET STREET
The Christensen court upheld REET on the transfer of
real estate to a corporation in exchange for stock.2 2 9 Signifi-
cantly, the transaction in Christensen was taxable precisely
because corporate stock was exchanged for realty.230 In some
cases, however, stock need not be exchanged for real estate in
a single transaction. Rather, one can avoid REET liability as
applied in Christensen through a two-step transaction.
Consider the following two-step transaction. Able is a
landowner who desires to transfer his personal real estate
ownership to a corporation. Able creates a corporation and
registers one hundred percent of the corporate stock in his
name. Able then transfers his real estate to his corporation as
a capital contribution. Able receives no stock in return for the
transaction; hence, Able exchanged no consideration for the
realty, and the transaction is not taxable. 231 Note, however,
that Able is the sole stockholder of the corporation. Conse-
226. Id. at 189, 437 P.2d at 702.
227. Id. at 190, 437 P.2d at 703.
228. See, e.g., Weaver, 73 Wash. 2d 183, 437 P.2d 698; Ban-Mac, Inc. v. King
County, 69 Wash. 2d 49; 416 P.2d 694 (1966).
229. Christensen v. Skagit County, 66 Wash. 2d 95, 98, 401 P.2d 335, 337 (1965).
230. 1& at 97, 401 P.2d at 336.
231. See WASH. REV. CODE § 82.45.010 (1989); see also 63-64 Op. Att'y Gen. 44
(1963), dff', 77 Op. Att'y Gen. 6 (1977) (ruling that a capital contribution of real estate
to a corporation is not a REET taxable transaction); cf Adopted Regulation, 1990 N.Y.
Tax LExiS 523, at *4 (N.Y. Comm'r Tax & Fin. Oct. 22, 1990) (stating that pursuant to
New York State's Realty Transfer Tax, the following rule applies to partnerships: "A
conveyance by a partner to the partnership as a contribution of partnership assets is
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quently, Able owns one hundred percent of the stock in a cor-
poration that includes Able's previously owned real estate as
an asset. Thus, by transferring his realty as a capital contribu-
tion, Able incurred no REET liability despite the hurdle cre-
ated in Christensen.
A. Troubleshooting the Underlying Problem
Deer Park and its progeny make clear that a transfer of
real estate from a corporation to its shareholders in dissolution
is not a taxable transaction. These cases also stand for the
proposition that corporate stock transfers are not subject to
REET even if the stock represents only realty assets.232
In addition, according to the Department of Revenue, the
transfer of a partnership interest is not a real property transac-
tion.2 3 Therefore, realty can be transferred either in corpo-
rate or partnership form with unlimited shelter from REET.2
For example, "a corporation largely made of timber land can
be readily sold and resold without taxation.
' 23 5
Under Christensen, incorporating and transferring realty
into the corporation in exchange for stock is a taxable transac-
tion. 36 But, as just illustrated, it is not difficult to circumvent
Christensen's holding simply by transferring the realty to the
corporation as a capital contribution without directly receiving
stock. The end result is that a sophisticated party can easily
transfer realty using a corporation as the transfer vehicle and
completely avoid REET on the realty sale. Creating a corpora-
tion is an inexpensive process. As an incentive for a buyer to
purchase property through corporate stock, rather than simply
by deed, a seller can agree to share the resulting tax savings by
lowering the realty's price.
subject to tax to the extent that there is a change in beneficial ownership"). An
analysis of New York State's Realty Transfer Tax can be found infra part VII.A.
232. See Estep v. King County, 66 Wash. 2d 76, 401 P.2d 332 (1965); Doric Co. v.
King County, 57 Wash. 2d 640, 358 P.2d 972 (1961); Deer Park Pine Industry, Inc., 46
Wash. 2d 852, 286 P.2d 98 (1955); see also 51-53 Op. Att'y Gen. 158 (1951).
233. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 458-61-570 (1990) (interpreting 51-53 Op. Att'y Gen.
158 (1951) to include both transfers of corporate stock and partnership interests as
transfers of personal property).
234. See id.
235. Christensen v. Skagit County, 66 Wash. 2d 95, 102, 401 P.2d 335, 340 (1966)
(Finley, J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 98, 401 P.2d at 337.
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B. A Few Specific Examples
Following are three subtly different transactions resulting
in REET avoidance. Each transaction is protected from REET
liability under Deer Park and its progeny. 3 7
A parent corporation forms a subsidiary and receives the
subsidiary's stock in exchange for both real and personal prop-
erty. Although stock is received in exchange for realty, the
parent corporation can avoid REET liability despite Christen-
sen... by claiming that they exchanged the stock solely for the
personal property transferred, and that the real estate was
transferred to the subsidiary as a capital contribution.239 As a
result, the sale does not incur REET liability.24 °
Mergers can also result in REET avoidance. For example,
one large corporation acquires the stock of several smaller cor-
porations, each with assets that include several parcels of
Washington State real estate. Each of the smaller corporations
are merged into a single subsidiary of the large corporation.
As a result, all of the real estate is transferred into the large
corporation's subsidiary, but no REET liability is incurred.24'
Finally, like corporate transfers and mergers, transfers
involving partnerships may take many forms that avoid REET.
For example, a buyer and a seller join together as partners to
complete a real estate transaction. The seller contributes real
estate to the partnership as a capital contribution, thus avoid-
ing REET liability. The buyer contributes cash to the partner-
ship equal to the real estate selling price. Next, the seller
takes distribution of the cash and retires as a partner. Upon
the seller's retirement, the partnership terminates, leaving the
buyer as the owner of the real estate without incurring REET
liability.
237. See cases cited supra note 190.
238. Christensen, 66 Wash. 2d 95, 401 P.2d 335 (holding that real estate transferred
in exchange for corporate stock is a taxable transaction); see discussion supra part
IV.E.
239. See 63-64 Op. Att'y Gen. 44 (1963) (ruling that contributions to capital do not
constitute taxable sales for REET purposes).
240. 3 Washington Tax Determination 259 (1987).
241. This scenario is further complicated due to legislation passed during the 1991
session. That legislation permits the merger of two or more limited partnerships and
the merger of limited partnerships and corporations. 1991 Wash. Laws 269.
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VI. THE REET STREET PLANNERS RETURN: RECENT
LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS TO SOLVE THE REET
STREET PROBLEM
While it may have taken several cases to verify the court's
acknowledgement of the loophole created by Deer Park, the
court in Ban-Mac expressly recognized its existence." Indeed,
the majority in both Ban-Mac and Weaver concluded that the
lack of legislative intervention in the years following Deer
Park condoned Deer Park's rationale.243 Today, however, it is
clear that the legislature is seriously grappling with how to
close the partnership and corporate transfer loophole.
A. Partnerships and Corporations After the 1991 Corporate
Transfer Act 24
In 1991, the Washington State Legislature made its first
attempt to close the loophole created in Deer Park.245 Through
the 1991 Corporate Transfer Act, the legislature clearly evi-
denced its intent to eliminate the judicially created inequities
under REET. The 1991 legislation, however, also made it clear
that accomplishing this task is easier said than done. Below
are a few examples of new concerns created by the 1991
legislation.
The 1991 Corporate Transfer Act created a new chapter in
the Revised Code of Washington entitled "Excise Tax on Own-
ership Transfer of a Corporation. '246  The new chapter, RCW
82.45A, aims at solving the corporation transfer loophole by
242. Ban-Mac, Inc. v. King County, 69 Wash. 2d 49, 51, 416 P.2d 694, 695 (1966).
243. Weaver v. King County, 73 Wash. 2d 183, 184 n.1, 437 P.2d 698, 699 n.1 (1968);
Ban-Mac, 69 Wash. 2d at 51, 416 P.2d at 695. In Weaver, Justices Hale and Finley were
not as confident as their colleagues. They disagreed that simply because the
legislature had failed to amend REET, it meant that the legislature would remain
content with the effects of Deer Park. As Justice Hale stated in his dissent: "[W]e can
derive little comfort from the often but wistfully expressed notion that the legislature
will soon see our error and correct it. In many instances, this legislative remedy
simply does not take place .. " Weaver, 73 Wash. 2d at 193, 437 P.2d at 704.
244. In 1981, the legislature first amended the REET statute to specifically address
a transfer made in corporate or partnership form. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.45.010 (1989)
(enacted as 1981 Wash. Laws 93). That amendment provided an exemption to promote
family-held corporation transfers, thereby facilitating inter-family non-taxable, non-
gift transactions. However, despite the 1981 legislation's appearance, it was not passed
to remedy the Deer Park decision. Instead, the exemption appears to have been for
estate planning purposes. Therefore, the first attempt to repair REET was not made
until 1991. Corporate Transfer Act, 1991 Wash. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 22.
245. Corporate Transfer Act, 1991 Wash. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 22 (codifying
engrossed substitute house bill (ESHB) 1831).
246. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 82.45A (Supp. 1990-91).
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treating changes in corporate real estate ownership as the
equivalent to realty sales.2 47 It is important to recognize, how-
ever, that while RCW Chapter 82.45A is aimed at addressing
the corporate transfer REET loophole, RCW Chapter 82.45A is
not a new section of REET.24" Rather, RCW Chapter 82.45A is
a separate tax imposed on an "ownership transfer of a
corporation. 
2 4 9
RCW Chapter 82.45A is composed of three sections. The
first section merely provides definitions. In particular, this sec-
tion defines an "ownership transfer" as "any transfer, or series
of transfers in any consecutive twelve-month period, for a val-
uable consideration, of ownership of stock, possessing more
than fifty percent of the total voting power of the issue....,
The second section 251 imposes the tax on "each ownership
transfer of a corporation, to be paid by the corporation, at the
rate of one and twenty-eight one-hundredths percent 25 2 of the
value of the real property assets of the corporation. '253 And
the third section provides a list of exemptions from the tax.254
Notably, several of these enumerated exemptions are also
exempt from noncorporate REET liability pursuant to RCW
82.45.010.255 However, the following three newly created own-
ership transfer exemptions25 are worthy of noting because
each significantly impairs the utility of the 1991 Corporate
Transfer Act.257
1. RCW 82.45A.030 Exemptions: What Do
They Really Mean?
Some of the most noticeable problems with the 1991 Cor-
porate Transfer Act are created by the statutory exemptions.258
While these exemptions are driven by unique policy considera-
247. Id, § 82.45A.020.
248. See id. § 82.45A.020; cf. id, § 82.45.060 (1989).
249. See id, § 82.45A.020 (Supp. 1990-91).
250. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.45A.010 (Supp. 1990-91).
251. Id § 82.45A.020.
252. This rate is equivalent to that imposed for noncorporate REET transactions
pursuant to id. § 82.45.060 (1989).
253. Id § 82.45A.020 (Supp. 1990-91) (emphasis added).
254. Id. § 82.45A.30.
255. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.45A.030(4), (5), (8) (Supp. 1990-91); cf. id. § 82.45.010
(1989).
256. See id. § 82.45A.030(1), (2), (6) (Supp. 1990-91).
257. Id ch. 82.45A.
258. Id. § 82.45A.030(1)-(6).
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tions surrounding corporate transfers, they nevertheless create
significant doubt as to the applicability of the newly passed
legislation.
a. RCW 82.45A.030(1): Adding Subjective Intent to an
Objective Area of Law
REET is based on the objective principle that when a sale
as defined by RCW 82.45.010 takes place, it is subject to REET
liability without regard to the seller's purpose for making the
sale.25 9 However, the first exemption to the 1991 Corporate
Transfer Act is based on the subjective intent of the seller.2 "
As a result, the tax does not apply to ownership transfers
"[w]hen the taxpayer demonstrates by a preponderance of the
evidence that the primary intent of the ownership transfer is
for purposes other than avoidance of the tax imposed in chap-
ter 82.45 RCW.
' 2 6 1
There clearly are, however, difficulties inherent in deter-
mining the primary intent behind a corporate stock ownership
transfer. For instance, the burden of determining the primary
intent of a corporate transaction motivated the Washington
State Supreme Court to refuse to apply the Kirnbell-Diamond
rule to a two-step transaction in Estep.262 That court stated:
"Adoption of the rule ... would involve the county and the
courts in a search for subjective intents, motives, and purposes
every time a transfer of stock is followed by a transfer of real
property.... ,263
In addition, the primary intent exception26' makes it
impossible for the Department of Revenue to promulgate stan-
dards dictating when a transaction is taxable. Instead, the tax
liability of each transaction will require a factual determina-
tion of the seller's primary motivations. Because several fac-
tors might motivate a seller, determining a seller's primary
motivation is difficult. For example, because of the large dis-
crepancy between the maximum federal income tax rate for
corporations (34%)265 and the REET rate (1.28%),2' a taxpayer
259. See WASH. REV. CODE § 82.45.010 (1989).
260. See i&. § 82.45A.030(1) (Supp. 1990-91)
261. Id
262. Estep v. King County, 66 Wash. 2d 76, 401 P.2d 332 (1965). See discussion
supra part IV.C.
263. Estep, 66 Wash. 2d at 80, 401 P.2d at 334.
264. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.45A.030(1) (Supp. 1990-91).
265. I.R.C. § 11(c) (1988).
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could be primarily motivated by a desire to save federal taxes.
In the end, the. difficulty of quantifying a seller's subjective
intent will impair a taxpayer's ability to plan transactions with
any certainty.
b. RCW 82.45A.030(2)." The Burden of Showing the Value of
Real Property Assets
The second exemption from the tax imposed by the 1991
Corporate Transfer Act applies to ownership transfers "[w]hen
the value of real property assets of the corporation is less than
fifty percent of the true and fair market value in money of all
assets held by the corporation at the time of the ownership
transfer."2"7 The problem with this exemption is that it places
an undue burden on the seller of corporate assets to know the
fair market value of all the corporate assets at the time of an
ownership transfer. While an appraisal could be performed at
the time of an ownership transfer to determine if the exemp-
tion applies, such a prerequisite is overly burdensome. Fur-
thermore, the statute fails to provide sufficient direction for a
taxpayer to perform such an appraisal. For example, a tax-
payer could include the value of intangibles, such as good will,
in the total value of the corporation. By doing so, the taxpayer
could inflate the value of the corporation's assets above the
threshold to qualify for the exemption provided by RCW
82.45A.030(2). 268 The statute, however, is not clear whether
such practices are consistent with the legislation's intent.
c. RCW 82.45A.030(6): What About Using Leverage?
A third and final exemption poses unique questions per-
taining to the 1991 Corporate Transfer Act. This exemption
provides that the tax does not apply to ownership transfers
"[s]olely for the purpose of securing a debt.""8 9 This exemption
has merit when considering the desirability of not restricting
corporate opportunities to finance operating capital. The
exemption also provides shelter from the tax in instances of
corporate reorganization for bankruptcy purposes. However,
while the exemption has some merit, it also creates an addi-
tional opportunity to avoid the tax.
266. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.45A.020 (Supp. 1990-91).
267. Id. § 82.45A.030(2).
268. Id
269. 1& § 82.45A.030(6).
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Because an ownership transfer solely for the purpose of
securing a debt is not taxable, a taxpayer could avoid the tax
through the following transaction: First, Able Corp. could
mortgage corporate-owned realty to Buyer for one hundred
percent of its value. The mortgage would be secured by a deed
of trust to the realty. The Buyer could then foreclose on the
mortgage. Consequently, Able Corp. would receive one hun-
dred percent of the property's value in cash while avoiding
REET, and Buyer would receive title to the property.
2. Returning to Real Property: Mining Leases
Moving away from the exemptions, RCW Chapter 82.45A
raises additional questions as to the viability of the 1991 Corpo-
rate Transfer Act.
The 1991 Corporate Transfer Act imposes a tax on an
"ownership transfer""7 only if at least fifty percent of the
transferred corporation's asset value is based on real prop-
erty.27 1 It would seem that REET should treat both corporate
and individual transactions the same. However, the following
scenario concerning mining leases suggests that the Corporate
Transfer Act 27 2 yields a different result for corporations than
REET does for individuals.2 7 3
Most real estate transactions do not bring into question
whether the property transferred is real or personal. How-
ever, as discussed earlier in the context of standing timber,274
there are particular transactions where uncertainty regarding
whether property is real or personal raises questions as to
REET liability. For example, a transfer in fee of mineral
rights in private land is a transfer of real property and is,
therefore, subject to REET pursuant to RCW Chapter 82.45.2"'
However, according to the Attorney General, unpatented min-
ing claims appurtenant to public lands are personal property
and, as such, are not covered by REET.276
RCW 82.45.010 excludes a transfer of any leasehold, other
than a lease containing an option to purchase, from REET.27 7
270. WASH. REv. CODE § 82.45A.010(1) (Supp. 1990- 91).
271. Id § 82.45A.020(2) (emphasis added).
272. Id ch. 82.45A.
273. Id ch. 82.45 (1989).
274. See discussion supra part III.B.3.
275. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.45 (1989).
276. 51-53 Op. Att'y Gen. 408 (1953); 55-57 Op. Att'y Gen. 84 (1954).
277. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.45.010 (1989).
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Because any ambiguity concerning a tax exemption is narrowly
construed, with taxation as the rule and exemption as the
exception,7 8 it would seem that the expressed exception for
leaseholds would not include a mineral lease that, in a sense,
grants the lessee any extracted mineral component of an estate
in fee. It also seems inconsistent not to tax mineral leases
when the lessee typically is required to pay a royalty to a les-
sor upon severance of mineral ore from the property equal to
some measure of the mineral value extracted.
However, the Washington State Department of Revenue
has relied on various authorities to conclude that a mineral
lease, with no option to purchase, is not subject to REET liabil-
ity under RCW Chapter 82.45. First, is Hoover v. Ford Prairie
Coal Co. 279 where the court held that an agreement granting
the right to enter property to mine coal in exchange for the
payment of royalties was a valid "lease. '2 ° Second, is RCW
82.45.010, which exempts from REET the conveyance of "any"
leasehold, except with an option to purchase real property.28 '
Thus, relying on these principles the Department of Revenue
has determined that a mining lease, void of a purchase option,
is not subject to REET liability under RCW Chapter 82.45.
While the department has determined that a mineral lease
without a purchase option is not subject to REET because of
the lease exception in RCW 82.45.010, the department could
treat the same transaction differently for RCW Chapter 82.45A
purposes. Instead, the department could find that a mining
lease, with or without an option to purchase, constitutes real
property.2 2 Such a position would not change the depart-
ment's stance regarding the taxability of mining leases pursu-
ant to RCW Chapter 82.45, because RCW 82.45.010 expressly
excepts all leases that do not have an option to purchase from
the definition of a taxable sale. However, no such exception
exists in RCW Chapter 82.45A. As a result, the transfer of a
mineral lease, without an option to purchase, could be a taxa-
ble transfer of real property when performed by a corporation
278. Budget Rent-a-Car v. Dep't of Revenue, 81 Wash. 2d 171, 174, 500 P.2d 764,
766 (1972).
279. 145 Wash. 295, 259 P. 1079 (1927).
280. 1.& at 306, 259 P. at 1082.
281. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.45.010 (1989).
282. E.g., Dabney-Johnston Oil Corp. v. Walden, 52 P.2d 237 (Cal. 1935)
(concluding that an oil and gas leasehold is actually a profit A pendre).
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while that same transaction could be exempt from REET if
performed by an individual.
3. Partnership Transfers Slipped Through the Cracks
An additional inequity in the 1991 Corporate Transfer Act
stems from the fact that although the tax attempts to close the
REET loophole when realty is transferred through a corpora-
tion, the corporate transfer tax does not cover partnership
transfers. 3 As discussed earlier, a common method used to
transfer real estate and avoid REET is to transfer or assign an
interest in a partnership that owns Washington real prop-
erty.284 The original version of the 1991 Corporate Transfer
Act included taxation of both partnership and corporate trans-
actions.28 5 However, partnerships were dropped from the legis-
lation prior to its final passage.28 6 As a result, the REET
loophole still exists for partnership transfers and will likely
cause a shift among taxpayers from the use of corporations to
the use of partnerships. Such a shift could easily defeat the
purpose of the 1991 Corporate Transfer Act, leaving behind a
statute that burdens corporate activities, while failing to close
the REET loophole.287
B. Despite the Legislature's 1991 Efforts, REET Street Is Still
in Need of Repair
Over thirty-five years passed between the time the Deer
Park court 288 first made changes to the corporate realty trans-
fer aspect of the REET Street blueprint,2 9 and the time the
legislative REET Street planners set their minds to repairing
the court's damage in 1991.2 °  The 1991 Corporate Transfer
283. See WASH. REV. CODE ch. 82,45A (Supp. 1990-91).
284. Partnership transfers are discussed supra part V.B.
285. See H.B. 1831, 52nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (1991).
286. See WASH. REV. CODE ch. 82.45A (Supp. 1990-91).
287. Similarly, the corporate transfer tax does not include taxation of real estate
transferred through a trust. The department could, under its general administrative
authority as stated in WASH. REV. CODE ch. 82.32 (1989), attempt to find such
transactions taxable through administrative interpretation of existing rules. See
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 458-61-230 (1990) (promulgated for administration of REET).
However, such a departmental determination would most likely be construed as an
abuse of discretion and not supported by the language of WASH. REV. CODE ch. 82.45A
(Supp. 1990-91) (codifying the corporate transfer tax).
288. Deer Park Pine Industry, Inc. v. Stevens County, 46 Wash. 2d 852, 286 P.2d 98
(1955).
289. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 82.45 (1989).
290. Id ch. 82.45A (Supp. 1990-91).
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Act,29 ' as enacted, was intended to tax those corporate trans-
fers of real estate that slipped through the cracks in the REET
Street pavement left behind by the court. 2 But it is clear that
the 1991 Corporate Transfer Act is riddled with shortcom-
ings293 that have left some of the REET planners dissatisfied
and desiring to make repairs.2 94 As a result, the 1992 legisla-
ture returned to the drawing board to consider a much greater
revision2 95 than that occurring in 1991.' However, before
studying the 1992 proposal in detail, this Comment examines
how other states have addressed similar proposals and high-
lights some tax policy considerations that should be considered.
VII. GOOD NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS ON REET STREET:
EFFORTS BY OTHER STATES AND RELATED TAx
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Like Washington, New York' and Delaware-9 s both tax
realty transfers. However, those two state's realty transfer
taxes differ slightly from Washington's REET,' thereby pro-
viding two examples of how Washington could rebuild REET
Street.
A. The New York Real Estate Transfer Tax
New York assesses two separate taxes on real estate trans-
actions. Those taxes include a "real estate transfer tax"" and
a "tax on gains from certain real property transfers."3 °1 For
291. Id
292. The corporate transfer loophole, created through judicial interpretation of
the REET statutes, is discussed supra part IV.
293. A discussion of the shortcomings present in the corporate transfer tax begins
supra part VI.A.1.
294. See S.H.B. 2447, 52nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (1992).
295. The fiscal note prepared for the 1992 version of S.H.B. 2447 further supports
the conclusion that REET and the Corporate Transfer Act combined fail to tax a
significant amount of realty sales. See Department of Revenue Fiscal Note no. 92-9
(1992). Because there is no formal disclosure requirement for transfers of real estate
interests by corporate or partnership entities, the Department of Revenue has little
knowledge of the number of such transactions that actually take place. However, the
department's research section estimated that an additional 10.1 million tax dollars
could be generated in fiscal year 1993 alone if REET and the corporate transfer tax
were replaced with the proposal provided in H.B. 2447 (1992). Id.
296. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 82.45A (Supp. 1990-91).
297. N.Y. TAX LAw § 1400 (McKinney 1987).
298. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 54-01-5415 (1989).
299. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 82.45 (1989).
300. N.Y. TAx LAw § 1400 (McKinney 1990).
301. Id. § 1441.
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purposes of analyzing Washington's REET, however, it is nec-
essary only to look at the New York real estate transfer tax.302
The New York real estate transfer tax imposes a tax at a
rate of two dollars and fifty cents for each five hundred dollars
of consideration exchanged for a "conveyance" of real prop-
erty.3"3 Payment of New York's real estate transfer tax, like
Washington's REET, is a condition to recording the realty
transfer.304
For purposes of the New York real estate transfer tax, a
"conveyance" is defined as "a transfer or transfers of any inter-
est in real property by any method, including but not limited
to sale, . . . conveyance upon liquidation or by a receiver, or a
transfer or acquisition of a controlling interest in any entity
with an interest in real property. ' 305 Thus, the tax includes
transfers of real estate made by corporations and partner-
ships3' and is expressly assessed against a conveyance result-
ing from the liquidation of a corporation. 30 7 However, the New
York real estate transfer tax is only imposed on a conveyance
of a "controlling interest" in an entity with an interest in real
property.308 A "controlling interest" is defined as either fifty
percent of the voting stock in a corporation, or fifty percent of
the interest in a partnership. °9
Therefore, New York's real estate transfer tax is very sim-
ilar to Washington's. 310 Like REET, the New York real estate
302. While the New York real property transfer gains tax is triggered by a real
estate sale, the gains tax is beyond the focus of this Comment. Because the real
property transfer gains tax taxes a seller's income realized from a sale of real property,
its underlying theory is inconsistent with Washington's taxing structure that is
constitutionally prohibited from imposing a tax on income. See supra note 15. The
New York real estate transfer tax, on the other hand, is an excise tax similar in nature
to REET. Therefore, New York's real estate transfer tax may shed light on how
Washington might address its current REET dilemma.
303. N.Y. TAX LAW § 1425 (McKinney 1990).
304. Id § 1410. Once New York's real estate transfer tax is paid, a stamp is affixed
upon the recording document. Id. While New York's real estate transfer tax can be
categorized as a stamp tax, in practice the nature of the tax is the same as an excise
tax like REET. See In re Jacoby-Bender, Inc. 40 B.R. 10 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984).
305. N.Y. TAX LAw § 1401(e) (McKinney 1990) (emphasis added).
306. See id.
307. 1I § 1401(e); Adopted Regulation, 1990 N.Y. Tax LEXIS 523, at *4 (N.Y.
Comm'r Tax & Fin. Oct. 22, 1990) (providing corresponding administrative rule at
§ [(e)] (5)).
308. N.Y. TA LAw § 1401(e) (McKinney 1990).
309. Id, § 1401(b).
310. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.45 (1989) (REET); id. § 82.45A (Supp. 1990-91) (cor-
porate transfer tax).
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transfer tax is assessed on a transfer of real property.3 1' And
like Washington's Corporate Transfer Act, the New York real
estate transfer tax is imposed on a transfer of a substantial
percentage of voting stock of a corporation that owns real
property. 12 Unlike Washington's REET, however, which is
imposed on real property "sale, 3 1 3 the New York real estate
transfer tax is imposed on a "conveyance" of real property.1 4
The similarities between portions of the New York real
estate transfer tax and Washington's newly created Corporate
Transfer Act are startling. 15 Significantly, these similarities
suggest that the New York tax influenced the drafters of
Washington's 1991 Corporate Transfer Act.3 16 The New York
tax, however, does not include the statutory exceptions that
create the earlier discussed deficiencies in the Washington cor-
porate transfer tax.31 7 Therefore, the New York tax lends
support for retaining Washington's current tax structure, so
long as the Washington State Legislature withdraws the cur-
rent exceptions to the corporate transfer tax that make the tax
ineffective.1 8
Although such a proposal is supported by the current use
of a similar concept in New York's real estate transfer tax,
such an alternative has one disadvantage: The Corporate
Transfer Act does not actually tax the real estate transfer per
se, but instead, taxes a transfer of corporate stock that repre-
sents an interest in realty.319 Because the goal is to tax the
actual sale of real estate, it does not make sense to tax the
transfer of corporate stock when the actual real estate transfer
can be taxed more readily. By taxing the transfer of corporate
stock, Washington's new corporate transfer tax unnecessarily
311. See N.Y. TAX LAw § 1401(e) (McKinney 1990). In such instances, the tax is
assessed against the fair market value of the real property transferred, as opposed to a
percentage of the consideration actually exchanged for the property. Cf. WASH. REV.
CODE § 82.45A.010(1) (Supp. 1990-91).
312. N.Y. TAX LAw § 1401(e) (McKinney 1990).
313. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.45.060 (1989).
314. N.Y. TAX LAw § 1401(e) (McKinney 1990).
315. See id § 1401(b) (McKinney 1990); qf. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.45A.010(1)
(Supp. 1990-91).
316. WASH. REv. CODE ch. 82.45A (Supp. 1990-91).
317. See discussion supra part VI.A.1.
318. Id.
319. See, e.g., Advisory Op., 1990 N.Y. Tax LExIs 736, at *3 (N.Y. Dept. Tax & Fin.
Oct. 24, 1990) (analyzing corporate reorganization resulting from the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 requirements).
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increases the complexity of corporate transactions.320 Further-
more, Washington's corporate transfer tax fails to include part-
nership transfers. Thus, even if Washington's Corporate
Transfer Act exceptions are removed from the tax, a crafty
real estate transferor who wishes to avoid the tax could still
use a partnership as the tax-avoiding transfer vehicle. 2'
The legislature may be better off by simply repealing the
recently promulgated Corporate Transfer Act and focusing its
energies elsewhere. Delaware provides an alternative
approach with greater merits.
B. The Delaware Realty Transfer Tax
Unlike Washington's REET, which emphasizes the trans-
fer of consideration as the taxable event in a real estate sale,322
Delaware's realty transfer tax imposes a tax upon the "mak-
ing, execution, delivery, acceptance or presenting" of a docu-
ment for recording.2 3  Payment of the Delaware tax is
evidenced by affixing a documentary stamp upon the document
that memorializes the realty transfer.324 The Delaware tax
also provides for several exemptions from the Delaware realty
transfer tax,32 5 as does Washington's REET." 8 However, Dela-
ware's exemptions are excluded from the definition of a taxa-
ble "document, 3 27 as opposed to Washington's REET, which
excludes certain transactions from the definition of a taxable
",sale.' 328
Delaware's realty transfer tax includes transfers made
through corporations and partnerships.3 9  However, Dela-
ware's tax does not tax a conveyance to or from a corporation
or partnership where the grantor or grantee had the same pro-
portional interest in the realty before the conveyance, 31 unless
the realty transfer results from corporate liquidation or part-
320. Id.
321. See discussion supra part V.B.
322. See WASH. REV. CODE § 82.45.010 (1989).
323. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 5402(a) (1989). The definition of a "document for
recording" for purposes of Delaware's realty transfer tax can be found in DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 30, § 5401(1) (1989).
324, Il tit. 30, § 5405.
325. See id. § 5401.
326. See WASH. REV. CODE § 82.45.010 (1989).
327. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 5401 (1989).
328. See WASH. REV. CODE § 82.45.010 (1989).
329. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 5401(7)a. (1989).
330. I& § 5401(1)n.
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nership dissolution. 3 '
In Delaware, a realty conveyance made through liquida-
tion or dissolution is taxed if the grantor or grantee has not
held the property for at least three years prior to the convey-
ance,332 unless the grantor owns eighty percent or more of the
beneficial interest in the realty prior to the conveyance and
retains eighty percent or more after the liquidation is com-
plete.333 If the grantor owns less than eighty percent of the
beneficial interest in the realty following the conveyance, the
conveyance is still taxable only if it is characterized as a sale of
real property by Delaware's Secretary of Finance."
Delaware's realty transfer tax statute also requires the
Delaware Secretary of Finance to promulgate regulations that
assist in determining whether a conveyance resulting from liq-
uidation or dissolution should be characterized as a sale of real
property.3 5  When promulgating rules, the secretary is
required to take into account the "timing of the transaction;
beneficial ownership prior to the conveyance or conveyances;
the business purpose of the corporation, partnership or trust;
and such other factors as may be relevant."'336 If the transac-
tion is found to be a sale of real property, the Delaware realty
transfer tax is assessed at a rate of two percent of the "value"
of the property.3 7 The "full and complete value" of the prop-
erty must be set forth in any document presented for recording
in Delaware, and it must be accompanied by an affidavit stat-
ing that the value presented in the document is legitimate.3
As a result, Delaware's realty transfer tax statute gives a
clear definition of the corporate and partnership realty trans-
fers that Delaware's legislature intends to tax. The statute
also gives Delaware's Secretary of Finance the discretion to
promulgate rules to address future realty transactions that
might have been inadequately addressed by the legislature. 3 9
Compared to Washington's REET, the Delaware realty trans-
fer tax is less open to judicial interpretation and is more easily
331. Id.
332. Id.




337. Id § 5402.
338. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 5409 (1989).
339. Id § 5407.
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tuned by administrative rule. And finally, unlike Washington's
REET, the Delaware realty transfer tax is not plagued by the
ambiguous nature of determining whether a transaction has
been made in exchange for consideration.
Now that we have considered how New York and Dela-
ware tax real estate transfers, we are ready to consider what
the 1992 Washington legislative proposal to remodel REET
Street entailed. Although the 1992 legislation never made it
out of committee, the legislation proves that the legislature is
studying REET. It is likely that the legislature will return
REET Street to the docket in 1993. Therefore, looking at the
failed 1992 proposal provides insight into the initial direction
and future direction of the legislature.
VIII. WASHINGTON'S 1992 PROPOSAL: WHAT WAS AT STAKE?
During the 1992 Legislature, Governor Booth Gardner
requested consideration of House Bill (HB) 2447. 4'0 The bill
was subsequently amended by the House Committee on Reve-
nue341 and redrafted as Substitute House Bill (SHB) 2447.'
SHB 2447 was aimed at rewriting Washington's currently
existing real estate sales tax laws by replacing them with a
"conveyance" tax on real property transfers. s The tax rate
for the conveyance tax was to remain the same as the current
REET rate: 1.28 percent plus local options. 44 By restructuring
the tax to close the existing loophole created by Deer Park and
its progeny, an additional $11.5 million in revenue per fiscal
year was anticipated. 1 5
More specifically, SHB 2447 would have replaced the cur-
rent use of the term "sale" as the taxable event in RCW
82.45.010 with the term "conveyance."'  The bill also would
340. H.B. 2447, 52nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (1992).
341. The substitute bill clarified that the existing local REET options and
associated revenues would not be effected by the legislation. It further clarified that
property tax liens would take priority over REET liens; that entering into an earnest
money agreements would not be characterized as taxable transactions; and that
creation of lien, by means of a mortgage, would not be taxable. H.B. Rep., H.B. 2447,
52nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (1992).
342. S.H.B. 2447, 52nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (1992).
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Fiscal Note, S.H.B. 2447, 52nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (1992). This estimate was
based on an actual survey of REET affidavits that were exempt under the current law.
Id.
346. S.H.B. 2447, 52nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (1992).
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have abolished all currently exempt transactions from the defi-
nition of "sale." 7 In exchange, the bill would have only
excluded the transfer of an easement, leasehold, license, equi-
table servitude, purchase option, and earnest money agreement
from the definition of a taxable conveyance.'
Additionally, SHB 2447 would have replaced the current
REET definition of "selling price," which is defined as the con-
sideration exchanged for the real property transfer, 49 with the
term "taxable value," which is defined in SHB 2447 as "the
true and fair value of the property conveyed." 50 As a result,
SHB 2447 would have calculated the amount of tax owing as a
percentage of the "true and fair market value of the property
conveyed," as opposed to the current method of using a per-
centage of the consideration exchanged in the realty transfer.
The true and fair market value is then defined as the total con-
sideration exchanged in an arm's length transaction, or under
other circumstances, the assessment value of the property as
maintained on the county property tax rolls.35 Thus, by tying
the taxable value to the property tax roles, the bill goes into
significant detail as to how the county assessors are to calculate
the property value, especially in the case of standing timber."2
Although the bill would have abolished the currently
existing exemptions from REET's definition of a taxable sale,
it would have also recreated several exemptions in a section
specifically listing tax exempt realty transactions. s 3 While a
complete discussion of the differences between the prior REET
exemptions and the SHB 2447 exemptions is beyond the scope
of this Comment, one difference is worth noting. SHB 2447
would have limited the existing exemption for gift transfers
solely to gifts made to a family member or an entity exempt
from federal income tax under Section 501(c) of the Internal
Revenue Code.ss
Now that we have briefly overviewed SHB 2447, we can
look at how the legislature proposed to solve the loophole cre-
347. See discussion on exemptions supra part III.A.
348. S.H.B. 2447, 52nd Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1(3), (4) (1992); cf. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 82.45.010 (1989).
349. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.45.030 (1989).
350. S.H.B. 2447, 52nd Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3 (1992).
351. Id.
352. IM. §§ 18, 20, 21, 22.
353. 1d. § 6.
354. Id. § 6(1). See I.R.C. § 501(c) (1988).
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ated by Deer Park and its progeny. The plan was quite simple:
it would have taxed any conveyance made by a nonfamily-held
corporation,-" with the exception of a transfer pursuant to
court approved reorganization under Chapter 11 or 12 of the
Bankruptcy Code.'
As a result, SHB 2447 represented the most comprehen-
sive taxing proposal we have seen regarding taxing realty
transfers by corporations. Because the proposal was to replace
the current REET prerequisites of a "sale"35 7 for "considera-
tion"'  with the concept of a "conveyance, 359 the proposal
would have closed the Deer Park loophole and was therefore
more comprehensive than REET. Also, because the proposal
contained none of the exemptions in Washington's current
Corporate Transfer Act,' the proposal was much more
restrictive. And finally, because the bill did not take into
account the percentage of realty ownership that was actually
transferred to a new party in the conveyance, the proposal was
more inclusive than either the New York or the Delaware
taxes discussed above. SHB 2447 failed,"' however, leaving
open the question of whether the proposal was too comprehen-
sive and inflexible for corporations performing legitimate cor-
porate planning activities.
IX. THE FUTURE OF REET
As the legislature's 1992 consideration of SHB 2447 makes
clear, REET's development is incomplete. The question we
must now consider is where should the legislature go from
here? The answer lies in one of several viable alternatives.
The appropriate alternative should be guided by a considera-
tion of how much flexibility corporations and partnerships
should have to practice legitimate business reorganizing func-
tions. It is important to recognize, however, that allowing too
much flexibility creates a risk that the tax can easily be
avoided. An optimal balance would capture all realty transac-
355. See S.H.B. 2447, 52nd Leg., Reg. Sess. § 6(5) (1992).
356. Id § 6(15). See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1231 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
357. WASH. REv. CODE § 82.45.010 (1989).
358. See id. § 82.45.030.
359. S.H.B. 2447 Sec. 1, 52nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (1992).
360. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.45A.030 (Supp. 1990-91).
361. S.H.B. 2447 was passed to the House Rules Committee by the House Revenue
Committee; however, the bill was never pulled from the Rules Committee and, thus,
died without floor debate. WASHINGTON STATE LEGISLATURE HISTORY REPORT, S.H.B.
2447, 52nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (1992).
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tions where a significant ownership percentage actually
changes hands, while not affecting transfers by corporations
and partnerships when the same individual continues to own
the realty before and after the transfer.
At one end of the spectrum, we have the 1991 Corporate
Transfer Act, which provides several exceptions to allow flexi-
bility. However, the exceptions also allow the tax to be
avoided easily. At the other end of the spectrum, we have
SHB 2447, which provides no flexibility for corporations or
partnerships, while leaving no doubt when the transfer will be
taxed. The solution is to find an acceptable middle ground.
The legislature could solve the REET Street dilemma
within the confines of the existing REET statute. 62 Currently,
REET allows a real estate transfer to a corporation or partner-
ship that is wholly owned by the transferor, or the transferor's
spouse or children, without invoking the tax. 33  REET
becomes due on the original transaction, however, if the trans-
feree corporation or partnership transfers the realty to some-
one other than the transferor or his spouse or children within
five years after the original transaction. 364 Thus, the statute, as
it now stands, can provide flexibility for close family transac-
tions. However, when those transactions lead to a transaction
that is beyond the scope the legislature intended to give prefer-
ential treatment to, the statute recaptures the tax that should
have been paid on the original transaction.
There is, therefore, no reason why the legislature could
not expand the existing recapture provision to include all cor-
porate and partnership transactions. By doing so, the legisla-
ture would provide flexibility to realty owners who want to
perform legitimate business planning functions by holding
realty in different forms. However, if the realty is actually
transferred to a new owner within a set period of time, any tax
due on the original transaction could be recaptured. From a
tax administration standpoint, the proposal is not overly bur-
densome. When the taxpayer executes the original transfer,
the county treasurers could simply enter the transaction into a
database; if a subsequent taxable sale takes place, the treasurer
could flag the original transfer for purposes of recapturing the
tax. But while this solution could be created with minimal
362. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 82.45 (1989).
363. See id. § 82.45.010 (1989).
364. Id.
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alteration of the current REET statute, it would only increase
the already confusing nature of Washington's REET and force
taxpayers to keep track of potential recapture liability.
So it seems that the answer lies not in trying to amend
Washington's already existing REET statute, but instead, in
rewriting the law to accomplish three goals: (1) make the new
law more clear regarding tax liability; (2) close the partnership
and corporate transfer loophole; and (3) allow a reasonable
amount of flexibility for corporations s6 and partnerships s6 to
reorganize. As discussed earlier in this Comment, s 7 because
Washington's REET is based on a "sale" for "consideration,"
many questions have arisen regarding whether to tax a given
transaction.3 s Although most of those questions have been
answered, finding answers to unlock the questions of future
transactions is unduly difficult and burdensome, s 9 especially
to the unweary taxpayer who is new to this area of the law.
Thus, it is time to say goodbye to today's REET.
As a replacement, the 1992 legislative proposal, SHB 2447,
has a great deal of merit if one change is made. Looking back
to our three goals, SHB 2447 accomplishes two of them in its
present form: (1) the proposal makes the law clearer regard-
ing tax liability; 70 and (2) the proposal would close the part-
365. E.g., Advisory Op., 1989 N.Y. Tax LEXS 514, at *2 (N.Y. Comm'r Tax & Fin.
Dec. 8, 1989) (finding realty transfer from subsidiary to parent corporation in exchange
for no consideration and without any change in beneficial ownership of the property is
not a taxable transaction).
366. E.g., Oceanside Harbor Associates v. Director of Revenue, 565 A.2d 893 (Del.
1989) (finding three individuals transferring realty into newly created partnership
while maintaining same aggregate percentage of realty ownership before and after
transfer is not a taxable transaction); see also Three Hundred Delaware Ave.
Associates v. City of Wilmington, 294 A.2d 105 (Del. 1972) (allowing "round trip" safe
harbor for straw conveyance from partnership A to Straw Corporation to partnership
B when real property ownership remained the same at all times).
367. See discussion supra part III.
368. E.g., JOHN J. O'CONNELL, OPINIONS OF THE ArTRNEY GENERAL ON EXCISE
TAX ON REAL ESTATE SALES (1968) (compiling several Attorney General opinions that
were requested due to confusion surrounding the sale for consideration requirement).
369. Washington's REET is not alone in creating confusion and court action aimed
solely at defining the term "consideration" in the realty transfer tax context. See, e.g.,
In re Park Ten Associates v. New York Dep't of Finance, 526 N.Y.S. 2d 962 (N.Y. 1988)
(considering effect of mortgage on total amount of consideration exchanged).
Confusion will always exist because "consideration" is a legal term of art and, as such,
it is subject to differing interpretations when used to calculate the total value of a
realty exchange. See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACTS § 211 (2d ed. 1990).
370. By replacing REET's current prerequisite of a sale for consideration with the
concept of a taxable "conveyance," a taxpayer's liability is clarified. While questions
can arise whether consideration has actually been exchanged in a real estate
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nership and corporate transfer loophole. But in order to
accomplish the third goal of allowing corporations and partner-
ships a reasonable amount of flexibility, SHB 2447 needs
amending. The language for that amendment can be found in
the analogous Delaware statute.371
Delaware's realty transfer tax, like SHB 2447, taxes a real
estate conveyance as opposed to a real estate sale. However,
unlike SHB 2447, Delaware's tax contains two exemptions that
are specifically aimed at allowing corporations and partner-
ships flexibility in holding real estate. 72 Those exemptions
carry out the same goals as the 1991 Washington Corporate
Transfer Act, but they are not plagued by the exceptions that
make the Corporate Transfer Act ineffective.
Thus, by incorporating the Delaware exemptions into the
transaction, there is little doubt that a conveyance has taken place when a grantee
produces title to newly acquired realty, requesting that it be recorded under a new
name.
371. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, §§ 5401(1)(n), 5401(7)(a), 5401(7)(c) (1989). More
specifically, the applicable language states:
(1) "Document"... shall not include the following.
n. Any conveyance to or from a corporation, or a partnership, where the
grantor or grantee owns stock of the corporation or an interest in the
partnership in the same proportion as his interest in, or ownership of, the real
estate being conveyed; provided, however, that this paragraph shall not apply
to any distribution in liquidation or other conveyance resulting from partial or
complete liquidation of a corporation, unless the stock of the corporation
being liquidated has been held by the grantor or grantee for more than 3
years; provided, further, this paragraph shall not apply to any conveyance
from a partnership to its partners unless the partners' interest in the
partnership has been held for more than 3 years....
(7) a. Except as provided in paragraph . . . c. of this subdivision, where
beneficial ownership in real estate is transferred through a conveyance or
series of conveyances of intangible interests in a corporation, partnership, or
trust, such conveyance shall be taxable under this chapter ....
c. Where the beneficial owners of real property prior to the conveyance or
series of conveyances referred to in this subdivision own 80% or more of the
beneficial interest in the real estate following said conveyance or conveyances,
such transfers shall not be subject to tax under this subdivision. Where the
beneficial owners of real property prior to the conveyance or series of
conveyances referred to in this subdivision own less than 80% of the beneficial
interest in the real estate following said conveyance or conveyances, such
transfers shall not be subject to tax under this subdivision, unless, under
regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Finance, such transfer or
transfers are properly characterized as a sale of real property. Such
characterization shall take into account the timing of the transaction,
beneficial ownership prior to and subsequent to the conveyance or
conveyances; the business purpose of the corporation, partnership, or trust;
and such other factors as may be relevant. Id.
372. Id.
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language of SHB 2447, the Washington State Legislature could
accomplish all three goals. The final result would allow a
grantor, corporation, or partnership to transfer realty into sep-
arate forms without incurring real estate sales tax liability,
unless a specific percentage of the real estate transferred actu-
ally changes hands. The proposal could also vest sufficient
authority in the Department of Revenue to promulgate rules
that would address additional tax liability issues as they occur.
And finally, the legislature could abolish both REET and the
Corporate Transfer Act, leaving one consistent realty transfer
tax in their place.
X. THE END
While REET has served Washington well over its several
decades of existence, it has always contained the inherently
difficult concept of when the tax is triggered, which is not by
the transaction, but by whether consideration is exchanged.
Unnecessary confusion and uncertainty confronting real estate
transaction planners has resulted. Even the Washington State
Supreme Court interpreted its way out of several opportunities
to clear up the confusion,73 each time coming to a reasonable
interpretation regarding whether consideration was actually
exchanged in the transaction before the court. But, in the
aggregate, those interpretations show that REET can easily be
manipulated by corporate and partnership realty transfers.
Thus, REET must be entirely redeveloped. A new tax statute
should be created that is facially clear.
In sum, this story of REET Street sought to accomplish
two goals: (1) to give the reader a complete understanding of
what REET means today; and (2) to advocate a legislative revi-
sion of REET for tomorrow. Hopefully, this story will become
only a historical perspective of REET Street once the Washing-
ton State Legislature finally solves the Deer Park puzzle.
373. See Estep v. King County, 66 Wash. 2d 76, 401 P.2d 332 (1965); Doric Co. v.
King County, 57 Wash. 2d 640, 358 P.2d 972 (1961); Deer Park Pine Industry, Inc. v.
Stevens County, 46 Wash. 2d 852, 286 P.2d 98 (1955).
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